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A B S T R A C T   
This paper analyses the evolution of the safety and soundness of the European banking sector during the various 
stages of the Basel process of capital regulation. We document the evolution of various measures of systemic risk 
as the Basel process unfolds. Most strikingly we find that the exposure to systemic risk as measured by SRISK has 
been steeply rising for the highest quintile, moderately rising for the second quintile, and remaining roughly 
stationary for the remaining three quintiles of listed European banks. This observation suggests that during the 
Basel process, systemic risk has been contained for the majority of European banks, but not for the largest and 
riskiest institutions. When analyzing the sources of systemic risk we find compelling evidence that the increase in 
exposure to systemic risk (SRISK) is tied to the implementation of internal models for determining credit risk, as 
well as market risk. Based on this evidence, the sub-prime crisis found especially the largest and more systemic 
banks ill-prepared and lacking resiliency. This condition has been aggravated during the European sovereign 
crisis. The Banking Union has not restored aggregate resiliency to pre-crisis levels. Finally, low-interest rates 
considerably affect the contribution to systemic risk, particularly for the riskier banks.   
1. Introduction 
This paper has two main contributions: Firstly, it is the first paper 
that traces the long-run evolution of risk measures of banks and financial 
institutions over the whole period of operation of the Basel process of 
capital regulation, both for systemic as well as for individual risk. The 
paper focuses on the cross-section of European listed banks from the 
beginning of the Basel process in 1988. The second contribution relates 
the various risk measures to the underlying economic mechanisms. How 
is the evolution of the various risk trajectories related to the regulatory 
process itself? How is it related to other developments in international 
banking markets? In particular, how do these relations vary across the 
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cross-section of banks? Did, and if so, in which sense did this process 
enhance the resiliency of banks? 
These issues are of crucial importance for evaluating and reforming 
the Basel process. Since right from the start in 1988, it has always been 
the intention of the Basel Committee to increase the safety and sound-
ness of banks and the global banking system, while at the same time 
maintaining a level playing field in an increasingly globalized banking 
industry (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988).1 The Basel 
process has been one of continued reform of the original minimum 
capital standard that affected both, the definition of capital and the risk 
weights of different asset categories. Most notably, the market risk 
amendment of 1996 and the reform package Basel II (2006) successively 
introduced choices between statutory risk weights or risk weights based 
on institutions’ own calculations with the help of internal models. The 
experience of the Great Financial Crisis certainly suggests that the 
original goals might not have been reached; immediate regulatory re-
form was required after the Lehman insolvency, which triggered a new 
phase of the process now commonly referred to as ‘Basel III’. Our 
analysis provides insights into which aspects of regulatory reform may 
still require particular attention and scrutiny. 
If the intentions of the Basel process of capital regulation had been 
achieved, one might have expected a general decline in measures of 
individual as well as systemic risk over the past 30 years, reflecting an 
increase in bank resiliency. However, we find differently. By tracing 
SRISK, a systemic risk measure developed by Brownlees and Engle 
(2017)), we observe a secular increase in the average expected capital 
shortfall in the European countries from below 5% of country GDP to 
about 20%.2 We adopt a quantile approach, and in our findings, we see 
that this increase is mainly driven by the build-up of capital shortfall in 
the highest quintile of the distribution of banks, while the lowest three 
quintiles are only weakly increasing capital shortfall. 
Based on initial descriptive analyses, other measures of systemic risk 
also do not readily support the view that banking regulation in the long- 
run has increased the stability and soundness of the banking system at 
large. One might argue that general economic risk factors have increased 
tremendously in intensity and, hence, resiliency would have been much 
lower in the absence of any Basel regulation. However measures of in-
dividual risk, such as the Z-score, show an increase in individual sol-
vency, including an increase in the distance-to-default in the most 
systemically relevant part of the distribution, implying that at large in-
dividual risk factors seem to have been taken into account. Hence, a 
structural approach is needed to control for the quantitative contribu-
tion of economic risk factors and to identify the various drivers of sys-
temic as well as individual bank risk. 
Our multivariate analysis of systemic and individual bank risk 
measures builds on unconditional quantile regressions in order to take 
into account the cross-distributional heterogeneity and the evolution of 
bank characteristics as well as market variables. Since our risk measures 
are based on market valuations, we consider the standard drivers of 
bank stock prices as controls. In addition, we control for market stress, 
macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy. 
We observe that the implementation of market as well as credit risk 
models along Basel II regulation have a strong non-linear relationship 
with the individual bank systemic risk exposures as measured by SRISK. 
With the Basel amendment in 1996, banks were allowed to implement 
internal models to measure their market risk and estimate market-risk 
weighted assets. We observe, since the introduction of market risk 
models, a reduction in systemic risk exposures for the lower risk quan-
tiles of banks, but, paradoxically, an increase at the upper quantile of the 
distribution. Along the same line, Basel II in 2006 introduced the option 
of using internal models to estimate credit risk and credit-risk weighted 
assets. We see that also internal models for credit risk tend to be 
asymmetrically related to banks’ exposures. Overall, the introduction of 
self-regulatory options to calculate risk-based capital on credit expo-
sures tends to be a large source of systemic risk exposure during and 
after the crisis. 
To dig even deeper, we study the effect of credit risk internal models 
with bank-level implementation data, where we observe a strong 
aggravating impact on SRISK from the implementation of advanced 
internal models. Exercising the option of determining most parameters 
for the quantification of credit risk by means of internal models 
(advanced approach) contributes to systemic risk across all risk classes, 
but with the largest impact on the most risky banks. We perform various 
robustness checks and our results are strongly consistent. They are 
particularly robust in a difference-in-differences approach carried out on 
the sample of banks implementing advanced IRBA models after Basel II, 
versus a sample of control banks matched by propensity score matching. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the Basel process 
and relates our work to the literature. Section 3 introduces the data and 
methodology and presents the main descriptive results for the systemic 
as well as the individual bank risk measures. The multivariate analysis is 
provided in Section 4. A difference-in-differences analysis is presented in 
Section 5 before Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Basel process of capital regulation 
2.1. History 
The Basel process of capital regulation was triggered in late 1974. 
The first meeting of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices took place in February 1975. After a long period of 
consultations,3 the first Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) was approved by 
the G10 governors in December 1987 and publicly announced in July 
1988. The Accord was formally implemented in December 1992. 
The Accord had already been amended in 1991, to reform the 
treatment of loan loss reserves, and later repeatedly in 1995 and 1996. 
The most important amendment was the introduction of internal models 
under supervisory review as an alternative to statutory rules in January 
1996 as part of the Market Risk Amendment (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 1996). This amendment essentially provided a 
choice between a self-regulatory option under supervisory review and 
statutory regulation. It was designed to provide incentives to improve 
in-house risk management models, which were highly deficient in the 
1990 s even in multinational banks (see Wuffli, 1995). However, the 
amendment also implicitly provided incentives to employ internal 
models as an instrument to reduce regulatory burdens and capital 
charges, and, hence, to reduce resiliency (see Hellwig, 1995). 
Proposals for a new capital accord were triggered by the initiation of 
a consultation process on a Revised Capital Framework in June 1999. 
This became the basis of the three-pillar framework of Basel II, which 
formally culminated in June 2006 in the agreement on Basel II: “Inter-
national convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a 1 In its 1988 Report, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision explicitly 
states: “Two fundamental objectives lie at the heart of the Committee’s work on 
regulatory convergence. These are, firstly, that the new framework should serve 
to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system; 
and secondly that the framework should be in [sic!] fair and have a high degree 
of consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view to 
diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international 
banks." (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988)  
2 At the height of the Great Financial Crisis capital shortfall peaked in 
December 2008 close to 30% of GDP of an average European country. 
3 See Goodhart (2011) for details on the early years of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision. 
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revised framework for comprehensive supervision". 
Basel II was adopted in most countries with the notable exception of 
the U.S., one of its strongest original supporters. However, the impact of 
its implementation could not be properly assessed4 since already in 2007 
the subprime crises developed into a worldwide crisis and depression. 
Hence, already in September 2008, the Basel Committee was forced to 
reconsider its regulatory framework with its guidelines on Principles for 
Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision triggering the dis-
cussion on reforming Basel II, a process now commonly referred to as 
‘Basel III’. 
In November 2017, Basel III was finally concluded after long nego-
tiations. A major stumbling block of the Basel III negotiations was the 
role of internal models. While the U.S. initially insisted on completely 
phasing out internal credit risk models, the large European countries, 
and especially Germany and France, insisted on maintaining them while 
agreeing on curbing their effectiveness. The final agreement reduces the 
impact of internal models by a so-called ‘output’ floor, that limits the 
amount of reduction of risk weights with internal models to 72.5% 
relative to the standard approach. Obviously this long-standing debate 
about capping internal models reflects deep political disagreement 
about the contribution of internal models to bank stability and 
competitiveness. 
In light of the regulatory process one would expect a continuous 
improvement of resiliency measures, both in terms of individual banking 
risk as well as with respect to systemic risk and across the whole cross- 
section of banks. After all, the Basel Accord aimed at increasing the 
safety and soundness of the banking industry right form the start. 
With hindsight, Freixas et al. (2015)) argue that the Great Financial 
Crisis of 2007/8 revealed an insufficient treatment of systemic risk in 
Basel II regulation, focusing mainly on micro-prudential and neglecting 
macro-prudential concerns. Accordingly, Basel III reform is far more 
concentrated on macro-prudential supervision designed to enhance 
systemic resiliency. According to this perspective, systemic risk mea-
sures should be particularly responsive to the Basel III reforms. 
Overall we would expect that the regulatory process enhances 
resiliency measures precisely for those banks that are exposed to risk at 
most. 
2.2. Literature 
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic long- 
run evaluation of the effect of the Basel process of capital regulation 
on the safety and soundness of banking systems. 
While the research papers discussed below opt for partial approaches 
focusing on specific sets of policy instruments, we take a holistic cross- 
country perspective to a larger set of regulatory instruments. This allows 
us to both measure the combined effect of all policy measures and to 
assess the relative contribution of different instruments to the resiliency 
of banks. Moreover, by taking a quantile approach, we can assess the 
implications of different regulatory instruments on different risk groups. 
And finally, by relying on market data, our approach incorporates 
market views and market trust, which is complementary to information 
incorporated in book values and supervisory data, on which most of the 
partial approaches rely. 
The only paper, we are aware of, taking a similarly comprehensive 
view of the Basel process in the early stages, now dubbed Basel I, is 
Wagster (1996)). His focus is on the political economy of implementing 
capital regulation and its consequences on the valuation of Japanese 
banks. He finds that the early Basel process can be viewed as a political 
bargaining process between national regulators. Many agreements by 
Japanese authorities, in particular concerning the regulatory treatment 
of hidden reserves, were elicited by concessions to the Japanese banking 
sector that were subsequently capitalized in market prices and can be 
measured accordingly. However, he did not assess the implications of 
that process on banking stability. 
The option of Basel II, allowing banks a high degree of discretion in 
determining their own risk weights for their loan portfolio subject to 
supervisory review, generated intensive debate well before the imple-
mentation of Basel II. Notably, Danielson et al. (2001)) raised serious 
concerns about the endogeneity of risks not being addressed at all within 
the Basel II framework.5 The authors warn emphatically that Basel II 
might not work at all, and unintentionally and paradoxically even 
reduce safety and soundness of the banking system.6 Interestingly, at the 
same time, leading researchers at the BIS explicitly mention procyclical 
amplification as a challenge to Basel II and argue in favor of 
counter-cyclical capital buffers (Borio et al., 2001) and a more 
macro-prudential approach (Crockett, 2000), central features of the 
Basel III reform, well before the implementation of Basel II. 
Indeed, important concerns raised prior to the implementation of 
Basel II were found justified ex-post in empirical work. In a cross- 
country sample of 21 OECD countries, Mariathasan and Merrouche 
(2014) find convincing time-series evidence that banks that were given 
supervisory permission to adopt internal models attempting to strate-
gically manipulate risk weights. This effect is particularly strong for 
weakly capitalized banks in countries with weaker supervision. How-
ever, since the authors concentrate on the adopting banks only, they 
cannot assess the quantitative impact of the IRB approach relative to the 
standard approach. 
In a quasi-experimental research design, Behn et al. (2016a) docu-
ment a strong pro-cyclical amplification affect of model-based capital 
regulation on bank lending in a sample of German banks relative to 
statutory regulation, as predicted by Danielson et al. (2001).7 Behn et al. 
(2016b) focus again on a large sample of German banks and find that risk 
weights based on the model-based approach underestimate actual default 
rates by.5 to 1% points. Accordingly, risk weights under the model-based 
are not commensurate with true underlying economic risk, which is re-
flected in higher risk premia charged by the banks on those loans. 
Our work extends the research of Behn et al. (2016a, 2016b) to Eu-
ropean banks, and that of Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) to the full 
cross-section of (listed) European banks. We largely confirm and extend 
the prior findings and place them in perspective across the full 
cross-section of adopting and non-adopting banks. Moreover, while the 
above-cited contributions focus mainly on the effect of IRBA imple-
mentation on systematic credit risk, we focus on the systemic implica-
tions of the longer Basel process. Our study places in perspective the 
contribution of Basel II regulation to systemic risk relative to other in-
struments of the process of capital regulation (e.g. internal models for 
market risk under Basel I) since the early days of the Basel process. In 
addiction, we run quantile regressions, therefore we can drawn insights 
on the full distributions of European-listed banks. 
After the experience of the Great Financial Crisis, various suggestions 
have been made to correct the short-comings of Basel II. One suggestion 
to correct for potentially undue competitive advantages of systemic 
banks applying internal models is the bucket approach developed by the 
4 Given the length of the consultancy process for Basel II, it is quite likely that 
the process did affect bank business models already well before the official 
implementation date. Moreover, the self-regulatory pillar allowing internal 
models was available to officially and fully compliantly drive bank business 
models since 1996. 
5 On the problem of neglecting the endogeneity of systemic risk see also 
Hellwig (2010)).  
6 For an earlier critique of the model-based approach to incorporate market 
risk see Gehrig (1995),(1996) and Hellwig (2009). Moreover, early literature by 
Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and 
Rochet (1992) establishes that risk-based capital standards may increase bank 
failure risk if risk weights are not optimally chosen. 
7 See also Repullo and Suarez (2012) for a theoretical model on the procy-
clicality of capital regulation. 
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BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014).8 Taking into 
account size, interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity, an 
index of systemic importance is developed and, accordingly, capital 
charges can be levied in five steps9 in order to enhance resiliency of the 
most systemically important institutions. Our analysis confirms that 
those banks that were allocated to one of these buckets at least once 
indeed exhibit significantly higher level of SRISK than average banks. 
Moreover, we find that, in line with regulatory intentions, the imposi-
tion of the extra buffer did contribute to reducing the capital shortfall. 
Closest to our work is Bostandzic and Weiss (2018), who compare 
systemic risk exposures of banks across the Atlantic. On the basis of data 
1991–2014, they find that European banks on average are more exposed 
to systemic risk, as measured by SRISK, than US-banks. They explain the 
difference in risk exposure by the lower average quality of the loan 
portfolios of European banks. However, by focusing on the mean ex-
posures, they ignore the substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
SRISK exposures, which is the focus of our work.10 
While not at the core of our work, we find results relevant for 
monetary policy complementing related work. Colletaz et al. (2018) 
document a general build-up in systemic risk-taking in Europe due to the 
monetary policy of the ECB. They show that aggregate SRISK is induced 
by monetary policy. By applying a quantile approach, we find a quite 
more nuanced picture: while smaller banks tend to reduce capital 
shortfall with lower short-term interest rates, larger banks actually in-
crease risk-exposures. Moreover, we find that the asset purchase pro-
gram does not seem to be related to capital shortfall (SRISK) in the lower 
quartiles, while correlations are positive and significant for the highest 
quartile. Asset purchases, on the other hand, are related to a reduction in 
capital shortfall for the lower quartiles only, but not at the upper end of 
systemically important banks. 
3. Measures of bank resiliency 
This section reports details on the data and the construction of the 
sample. We then define the main measures of systemic and individual 
risk used in the analysis, before presenting the most striking descriptive 
findings. 
3.1. Data and sample 
In order to assess the implementation of the Basel principles, we 
conduct an empirical investigation on a sample of European financial 
institutions from 1987 to 2018. Overall, we estimate systemic risk, as 
well as individual banking risk, for 1117 banking institutions from the 
Euro-area, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.11 Among all listed 
financial institutions covered by Compustat Global (GICS codes 40 and 
60), we selected all commercial banks and diversified banking in-
stitutions (GICS codes 4010 and 4020, respectively). We obtain daily 
market data (prices and capitalization), keeping only ordinary common 
shares and excluding secondary listings, and lagged quarterly balance 
sheet data (book values of equity, total assets and liabilities, and ROA).12 
All data are converted to US dollars.13 Moreover, in the estimation of the 
risk measures, we use the MSCI Europe index as the broad market return 
(Datastream data), and the yield on German federal bonds (Bundesbank 
data) as the risk-free rate. The next sub-Section 3.2 reports descriptive 
statistics from this sample of 1117 distinct institutions from the Euro- 
area, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.14 
Later in the paper, the inference analysis is performed on a sub-group 
of this sample, where bank-level information on IRBA models is avail-
able through the SNL database. With Basel II, banks were allowed, past 
regulatory approval, to use in-house internal models to quantify credit 
risks of their loan portfolios. Next to following the coarse regulatory 
categories of risk weighting (Standardized approach), banks have the 
option to develop their own so-called internal models and estimate the 
probability of default of loans only (Foundation approach), or, addi-
tionally, also the exposure-at-default and the loss-given-default to 
quantify their credit risk-weighted assets (Advanced approach). SNL 
provides bank-level quarterly information on the implementation of 
these internal models for credit risk (IRBA) from 2006, distinguishing 
three categories: (i) Standardized IRB approach, (ii) Foundation IRB 
approach, (iii) Mixed IRB Approach, and (iv) Advanced IRB approach. 
We checked this information with proprietary approval dates of internal 
models from the Bundesbank, the Österreichische Nationalbank and the 
Bank of England. Section 4 reports the inference analysis based on this 
sub-sample, comprising of 99 banking institutions (see Table 8 in the 
Appendix) from the above countries (excluding Cyprus for data 
availability). 
Finally, we use several control variables in the regressions. We ob-
tained the market stress indicator CISS from the authors (Holló et al., 
2012), and we collected macro variables from OECD (unemployment 
rate, GDP, and PPI). Further information on the control variables used is 
reported in Section 4 and in Tables 4 in the Appendix. We also report in 
the Appendix information on the correlation matrix of the main vari-
ables of interest (Table 5), the summary statistics by Basel periods 
(Table 6) and IRBA categories (Table 7). 
3.2. Measures of bank resiliency 
The resiliency of banks can be measured on the level of an individual 
bank as well as on a systemic level with the interaction of all banks. This 
separation accords well with the distinction between micro-prudential 
and macro-prudential regulation.15 While the former aims at 
increasing bank resiliency by reducing individual banks’ failure risk, the 
latter aims at reducing systemic spill-overs or amplifications at the in-
dustry level. 
We start by presenting the trajectories of systemic risk measures 
before contrasting them with measures of individual banking risk, since 
they have become the main focus of current regulation and supervision. 
We start with the capital shortfall measure SRISK developed by 
Brownlees and Engle (2017), which measures a bank’s exposure to 
systemic risk. Next, we present the trajectories of the contribution 
measure ΔCoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).16 While arguably 
8 See Benoit et al. (2019) for a description of this approach  
9 Buckets 1–5 range from 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 3.5% respectively  
10 There are also slight differences in the sample used and in the calculation of 
SRISK. While we follow the parametrization suggested by Engle et al. (2015), 
those authors differentiate between banks with high and low level of gross 
derivatives (p.21).  
11 In details, we include institutions from Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, 
Island, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, and Portugal.  
12 As the quarterly data go back to 1996, we complete the information back to 
1987 with annual balance sheet data.  
13 Since our data start as early as 1988, well before the introduction of the 
Euro, we prefer to translate all currencies into US dollars. 
14 We purposefully do not clean for merger activity. Some authors argue that 
systemic risk increased in conjunction with merger activities (Wagner, 2010). 
As the scope of our paper is to investigate the overall stress to the market, we do 
not see appropriate to remove episodes of increasing systemic risk. In robust-
ness checks, we include the annual number of mergers and acquisitions as a 
regressor to capture this impact (see Table 11).  
15 These terms were developed well in the discussions about Basel II (Borio 
et al., 2001; Crockett, 2000). Macro-prudential concerns became dominant in 
post-crisis reforms (see Freixas et al., 2015)).  
16 The literature (see especially Giglio et al., 2016) provides a multitude of 
alternative systemic measures aggregating different information according to 
different underlying economic mechanisms. For example, the literature review 
of Benoit et al. (2017) classifies systemic risk according to three different 
economic mechanisms: systemic risk-taking, contagion and amplification of 
shocks, each giving rise to different measurement issues. 
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systemic risk measures are the focus of current macro-prudential regu-
lation, individual bank failure risk was the focus of prior 
micro-prudential regulation. Therefore, we also provide trajectories for 
a variant of the Z-score as modelled by Boyd and Runkle (1993). 
3.2.1. SRISK 
We measure the exposure to systemic risk by means of SRISK, the 
expected capital shortfall measure developed by Brownlees and Engle 
(2017). Formally, it is designed to measure the market value of equity 
required to be issued at market prices in order to render the bank 
compliant again with regulatory standards after a serious and protracted 
crisis. Theoretically, SRISK for bank i in period t is defined as: 
SRISKi,t = Et− 1[Capital shortfalli|Crisis]
= Et− 1[k(Debti + Equityi) − Equityi|Crisis]
(1) 
where k is the prudential capital ratio, that we assume 8%.17 Debti,t is 
book debt (total liabilities) prior to time t, while Equityi,t is market value 
of equity at time t.18 
Following Brownlees and Engle (2017)), we take into account how 
liabilities and market capitalization of the bank react to prolonged 
events of crisis. In case of major market distress, debt is not renegotiated 
in the short term, therefore outstanding book value of debt does not 
change. Instead, the current equity market value falls by the Long-Run 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES).19 LRMES is the expected loss in 
equity value of bank i, if the market were to fall by more than a d = 40% 
threshold within the next six months: 
LRMESit = 1 − exp(ln(1 − d)beta) (2)  
We estimate a dynamic market beta coefficient between the bank’s re-
turn and the market return. The return volatilities of each institution i, 
σi,t, and of the market, σm,t, are estimated by an asymmetric GJR GARCH 
model (Glosten et al., 1993). The correlation between each institution 
return and the European market index, ρi,t, is estimated by a Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model (Engle, 2002). 
Therefore, individual bank-specific SRISK, the expected capital 
shortfall a bank would experience in case of the above distress, can be 
estimated as: 
SRISKit = Et− 1[k(Debti,t) − (1 − k)(1 − LRMESi,t)Equityi,t] (3)  
Positive values of SRISK would represent the case of capital shortfalls, 
while negative SRISK represents the case of capital surpluses. 
Focusing on capital shortfalls, the positive side of the distribution, the 





, where J = firms with SRISK > 0 (4)  
It represents the percentage aggregate capital shortfall that would be 
experienced by the firm in the event of a crisis, and it allows for iden-
tifying the most systemic institutions in the sector. 
We report average bank-level SRISK aggregating positive shortfalls 
(Fig. 1). It measures the average amount of re-capitalization needed for a 
given capitalization standard, as an indicator of industry stress. Fig. 2 
reports the total capital shortfall of European banks in terms of the 
annual average country GDP. It illustrates that total capital shortfall has 
risen from less than 5% of GDP to about 15–20% of annual GDP. At the 
height of the Great Financial Crisis, capital shortfall reached almost 30% 
of annual GDP. 
By visual inspection of the first net-exposure measure of SRISK, three 
major level changes in aggregate SRISK catch the eye: i) the early stage 
from 1988 to 2001, ii) the period from 2002 to 2008 and the iii) sov-
ereign crisis stage from 2009 onwards. When averaging only positive 
shortfalls across institutions, a steady increase of absolute exposure to 
systemic risk is observed until 2008, from which on it remains constant 
at almost 2008 levels. 
Fig. 1. Evolution of exposure to systemic risk - average positive SRISK. The Figure reports the evolution of the daily estimated SRISK as Equation 3, averaged across 
banks including only positive SRISK (capital needs or shortfalls). We use a capital ratio k = 8%. 
17 Robustness checks have been produced with different capital ratios, ie. 
5.5%. However, the results do not different and they are therefore not reported 
here.  
18 As robustness checks, we also conducted the inference analysis using capital 
ratios of 3% and 5.5%.  
19 As the authors, we assume that banks’ returns follow a bivariate daily time 
series model of the equity returns of institution i, ri,t, dependent on a value- 
weighted market index m, rm,t. We use the MSCI Europe index for the market 
return rm,t as a representative benchmark for our sample of European banks. 
The return volatilities of each institution i σi,t and of the market σm,t are esti-
mated by an asymmetric GJR GARCH model (Glosten et al., 1993). The cor-
relation between each institution return and the European market index ρi,t is 
estimated by a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model (Engel, 2002). 
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Accordingly, average relative capital shortfall has increased contin-
uously until the Great Financial Crisis and has been reduced barely to 
pre-crisis levels of 2006. How does this relate to the original intentions 
of the BCBS? 
Moreover, has capital shortfall affected all banks alike, or do we 
observe differences in the cross-section? In order to address this ques-
tions we analyze the quintiles of the SRISK distribution. Rebalancing 
every year, we divide the financial institutions into 5 groups of positive 
relative exposure to SRISK, and we follow the evolution of the average 
capital shortfall. It turns out that it is essentially the upper two quintiles 
that cause most of the increase in shortfall, while the risk exposure for 
the majority of banks has increased only slightly until 2018 (Fig. 3). In 
any case the trajectories do not seem to reflect a long term increase in 
resiliency. It is interesting to note that the introduction of internal 
market risk models in 1996 seems to have exerted a short-lived, but 
discernible, moderating effect on the SRISK-trajectories across all 
quintiles. 
3.2.2. Delta CoVaR 
The contribution to systemic risk can be measured by Delta CoVaR, 
as developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). This is a purely 
market-based systemic risk measure, and, in contrast to SRISK, it 
Fig. 2. Evolution of exposure to systemic risk - average SRISK relative to annual country GDP. The Figure tracks the daily total SRISK, as the sum of the normalized 
expected capital shortfalls across banks. SRISK is estimated as Equation 3 and only the positive side of the distribution is considered (capital shortfall). Positive SRISK 
is normalized by annual country GDP. 
Fig. 3. Quantile effects and non-linearities. The figure reports the evolution of the daily average estimated SRISK (Equation 3), distinguishing five equal-size 
quintiles of relative capital shortfall (SRISK%), as in Equation 4, rebalanced annually. The top quintile (5-high) corresponds to the group of banks with the high-
est level of positive SRISK, while the bottom quintile (1-low) corresponds to the group of banks with the lowest level of capital shortfall. 
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measures the contribution of a financial institution to the risk of the 
overall financial system. Delta CoVaR is the market Value-at-Risk con-
ditional on a bank being in distress. Hence, it measures the contagion 
deriving from a bank being in distress to the whole banking system. 
This measure starts from the estimation of an aggregate extreme loss 
in terms of Value-at-Risk, as the maximum loss of the market return 
within the α%-confidence interval, conditionally on some event C(rit) 
observed for bank i: 
Pr(rmt ≤ CoVaRm|C(rit)t ) = α (5)  
Using a quantile regression approach, we identify this distress event of 
firm i as an equity loss equal to its (1 − α)% VaR, such as rit = VaRit(α). 
The systemic risk of the bank i is then defined as the difference be-
tween the CoVaR of the financial system conditional on firm i being in 
distress and the CoVaR of the financial system conditional on firm i 
being in its median state: 
ΔCoVaRit(α) = (CoVaRm|rit=(VaRit(α))t − CoVaRm|rit=Median(rit)t ) (6)  
As its authors, we will transform Delta CoVaR to positive values.20 
The trajectories of Delta CoVaR differ significantly from SRISK. This 
measure peaks at the time of prominent crisis events, such as around the 
Lehman failure in September 2008. To the effect that the subprime crisis 
has been characterized by a drying-up of liquidity, it appears remarkable 
that contagion risk has not shot up dramatically during the 2007–8 
period prior to the Lehman insolvency. 
Comparing Delta CoVaR and SRISK quintiles (Fig. 4), we see how the 
banks with the highest contribution to systemic risk tend to be also the 
banks with the highest SRISK throughout the time series (Fig. 4). 
Moreover, the difference in Delta CoVaR between low and high SRISK 
groups is widened after the 2009–10 crisis. 
3.2.3. Individual bank risk measures 
How about individual bank risk rather than systemic concerns? Did 
the Basel process succeed to significantly enhance the resiliency of in-
dividual banks? In order to address these questions we analyze the 
trajectories of individual bank measures of default. Distance-to-default 
is widely proxied in the banking literature by the Z-score (Boyd and 
Runkle, 1993; Fiordelisi and Marques-Ibanez, 2013). It measures the 
distance of bank’s ROA to the insolvency threshold in multiples of 
standard deviations. 
Z-score is a measure of the degree of solvency of an individual bank. 
It combines information on bank’s performance (ROA), leverage (eq-
uity-to-assets ratio), and risk (standard deviation of ROA). Higher values 
of Z-score represent a higher degree of solvency, as it represents a 
distance-to-default, as number of standard deviations away from the 
bank’s ROA augmented by the Equity-to-Assets ratio. 
We estimate a simplified version of Z-score for each institution, as: 




Again it is illustrative to take a cross-sectional perspective (Fig. 5). 
Accordingly, we sort banks according to their SRISK scores and trace 
their Z-score trajectories. It becomes readily apparent that resiliency has 
been increasing for the lowest quintiles of the SRISK-distribution, while 
it has been mainly stationary for the highest risk groups and only slightly 
increasing after 2004. 
In other words, across almost three decades, individual bank risk has 
been significantly reduced for the quintiles of banks that pose the 
smallest systemic concerns according to their SRISK-scores. This is 
particularly clear for the second group of SRISK, while less striking for 
the lowest quintile. On the other side, for the upper two SRISK-quintiles, 
long-run improvement of the Z-score is not striking. 
Summarizing the evidence on the three risk measures, we observe 
quite heterogeneous and unequal developments across our sample of 
banks. While banks associated with the lower three SRISK-quintiles have 
become and remained safe from a systemic point of view, the most 
systemic banks associated with the higher SRISK quintiles have not. The 
evidence presented so far does not speak in favor of a general increase in 
safety and soundness across the whole banking system despite regula-
tory efforts and numerous steps of reform during the Basel process of 
capital regulation. The evidence, however, does not necessarily speak 
Fig. 4. Quintile effects and non-linearities. The Figure reports the evolution of the daily average estimated Delta CoVaR as in Equation 6, estimated with quintile 
regressions. Delta CoVaR is averaged in five groups sorted by SRISK%, as in Equation 4. The top quintile (gr5) corresponds to the group of banks with the highest 
level of SRISK, while the bottom quintile (gr1) corresponds to the group of banks with the lowest level of SRISK. 
20 In the regression analysis, we will express it in dollar terms, thus weighting 
it with the market capitalization of bank i. 
T. Gehrig and M.C. Iannino                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of Financial Stability 55 (2021) 100904
8
against the success of regulatory reform per se, since the decrease in 
resiliency might just reflect an increasingly more risky environment of 
the global banking business. For such an assessment a deeper multi-
variate analysis is required that controls for the observable risk factors. 
4. Sources of bank risk 
Let us now analyse how the various risk measures relate to the 
economic and political conditions. To what extent can these observa-
tions be related to the realization of standard risk factors and to what 
extent are they affected, moderated or amplified by regulatory inter-
vention? We will analyze systemic risk exposure first, and then indi-
vidual banking risk. We will apply quantile regressions to allow for the 
distributional heterogeneity observed above in the descriptive analyses 
of Section 3.2. 
We use a sub-sample of 99 banks given data availability on the in-
ternal models implementation. On the level of policy variables, we have 
detailed bank-level information about internal credit risk models 
(IRBA). In particular, we know when banks were given permission to 
implement which type of model. We refer to the above description of our 
sample in Section 3.1. 
4.1. Sources of capital shortfall 
Let us start with a focus on SRISK as a measure of the exposure of an 
institution to systemic risk. As a hybrid measure, it relates market values 
to book values, combining the bank’s sensitivity to market returns and 
its leverage. Thus, in the analysis of its sources, we include both market 
and bank characteristics. As SRISK is a market variable of risk, we 
consider that all known drivers of bank asset prices will also affect 
SRISK. Therefore, we address the main factors in the asset pricing 
literature, market return, size and market-to-book, as drivers of market 
prices that could introduce endogeneity in our model. The Basel process 
is captured by bank-level information on the implementation of internal 
models for credit risk, and by Basel time dummies that identify the major 
steps of the Basel regulation over the years. 
Since we observe important nonlinearities in SRISK, we use quantile 
regressions to address potentially differential effects of our covariates 
across three quartiles of the distribution of SRISK. We use an 
unconditional quantile approach as (Firpo et al., 2009), where we 
marginalize the quantile coefficients using the recentered influence 
function. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients therefore cor-
responds to the usual interpretation, as the marginal effect on the un-
conditional quantile of SRISK of a location shift in the distribution of the 
covariates, ceteris paribus. 
We regress a dynamic panel data model of weekly SRISK, as it fol-
lows: 
SRISKit = α + L.SRISKitγ0 + Z′γz + X′γx
+IRBA′λim + (IRBAit*MV)′λimm
+BASEL′λb + μi + εit
(8) 
An innovative element of our analysis is the investigation of the 
impact of the introduction of self-regulatory tools looking at credit risk 
internal models, IRBA. One of the pillars of Basel II is the option to widen 
the scope for internal models also to cover credit risks. While at this 
stage we do not have sufficiently many (micro) data on the imple-
mentation or approval of internal models for market risk, we obtained 
this micro information about approval and/or adoption of internal 
credit rating models for our sub-sample of 99 European banks. 
Banks are classified into two IRBA groups according to whether they 
select approaches where the parameters are largely determined by the 
supervisors, or they apply the more aggressive models estimating most 
of the parameters by their own analytics. The former group is picked by 
the variable IRBA-S/F, that takes value 1 for banks i implementing the 
Standardized or the Foundation-IRBA for credit risk after the imple-
mentation date, and 0 otherwise and before the implementation of Basel 
II. Similarly, IRBA-A/M is set to 1 at the date at which the mixed or the 
advanced models for credit risks have been implemented at bank i. 
Banks that implement internal models tend to be larger in size, therefore 
we include the IRBA dummies with and without interaction with the 
market value of the bank, centered at its mean to ease interpretation. 
Moreover, the Basel regulation is captured by the introduction of 
time dummies highlighting the main steps of the regulatory process. 
Keeping “Basel I" (1: before 1996) out, we include: “Market Risk 
Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), “Basel II" (1: between 
June 2006 and September 2008), “Basel III" (1: between September 
2008 and September 2010), and “Banking Union" (1: after November 
2014). We also include a time dummy to isolate the effect of the 
Fig. 5. Evolution of idiosyncratic bank risk according to risk group. The trajectories report the evolution of Z-score, as in Equation 7 according to risk groups sorted 
by SRISK%. Z-score is averaged in five groups sorted by SRISK%, as in Equation 4. The top quintile (gr5) corresponds to the group of banks with the highest level of 
SRISK, while the bottom quintile (gr1) corresponds to the group of banks with the lowest level of SRISK. 
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“European Crisis", taking value 1 between September 2010 to November 
2014. In the Appendix, we report a robustness check where we introduce 
year effects, instead of the above Basel dummies. 
We control for market characteristics (Xqt) and bank characteristics 
(Zkit), and Table 4 in the Appendix reports more details on the variables 
used. Among the market-characteristics variables, we include country- 
specific factors and proxies for market investment opportunities: (i) 
country equity market return, (ii) country short-term interest rates, (iii) 
ECB composite indicator of systemic stress, CISS (Holló et al., 2012), and 
(iv) total amount of assets held by ECB for monetary policy. These 
variables should address the changing characteristics, as opportunities 
and stress, arising in the overall financial markets. Then, we expect 
SRISK to be positively correlated with other measures of market stress. 
In particular, we assume that the CISS indicator will flag earlier than 
individual SRISK, thus, we expect a positive relation between a lagged 
CISS and SRISK (Holló et al., 2012). Moreover, the introduction of 
country interest rates allow us to control for growth opportunities, while 
the total amount of assets held by the ECB for monetary policy would 
proxy for the unconditional monetary policy in the most recent years. 
The following bank-characteristics variables are included: (i) dy-
namic market beta, (ii) market capitalization, (iii) Z-score, (iv) leverage 
ratio, (v) market over- or undervaluation, following the book-to-market 
decomposition of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) ,21 and (vi) Globally Sys-
temic Banks (G-SIBs) dummies. These variables capture the 
time-changing cross-sectional differences in risk characteristics, and 
systemic risk is particularly affected by size, leverage and asset risk 
(Hovakimian et al., 2012). We expect larger banks to exhibit higher 
systemic exposures, given their complexity and interconnectedness. We 
then take a positive relationship between SRISK and market beta and 
distance-to-default (opposite to Z-score) as proxies for idiosyncratic risk. 
Moreover, we assume that highly levered banks contribute more to 
systemic risk, therefore we expect a positive relation between SRISK and 
leverage (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). We then consider that misvaluation 
from the market would negatively affect SRISK. Since SRISK is a 
market-based risk measure, we expect it to underestimate the true 
exposure to systemic risk in periods of high sentiment, and to over-
estimate the true exposure to systemic risk in periods of underpricing. In 
order to avoid issues of multicollinearity using the book-to-market value 
directly, we rely to the decomposition of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), 
considering the misvaluation from the historical industry norm. More-
over, the G-SIB dummies are designed to capture two effects: we include 
a fixed effect dummy that identifies the whole time series of a global 
systemically relevant institution, defined as such at least once by the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). Moreover, we include a dummy that 
takes value 1 in the years a bank is included in the list of G-SIBs by the 
FSB-BCBS. As we expect a positive sign for the former dummy, the latter 
G-SIBs variable would identify the impact on SRISK due to the imposi-
tion of extra capital to these institutions since 2012.22 
Finally, we use individual effects as country fixed effects. Thus, we 
allow for supervisory heterogeneity across jurisdictions as well as for 
other country-specific differences, such as regional economic condi-
tions. Literature shows that the characteristics of the regulatory regime 
impact on the risk-taking behaviour of the banking institutions (Barth 
et al., 2013; Ongena et al., 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2009).23 We also 
consider a robustness exercise with firm fixed effects and country macro 
variables. We use unemployment rate, GDP growth and PPI to capture 
the major economic conditions for each country.24Table 1 reports our 
key results and demonstrates that the policy impact of different Basel 
policy instruments is quite heterogeneous and non-linear across the 
cross-section of European banks. 
Interestingly, the introduction of market risk models in 1996 
(Jan1996-Jun2006) is associated with a risk-reducing effect in the lower 
two quartiles, while the dummy significantly contributes to SRISK for 
the highest quartile. This is in line with the descriptive trajectories of 
Fig. 3 and suggests that banks’ reaction to the Market Risk Amendment 
of Basel I has been quite different across the cross-section. Likewise, we 
find that the implementation of Basel II regulation (Jun2006-Sep2008) 
had a risk-reducing effect on the lower quartile banks, but not in the 
highest quartile. Similarly, the Basel III dummy (Sep2008-Sep2010) as 
well as the Banking Union dummy (Nov2014-Dec2018) did all 
contribute to reduce systemic risk for the lower quartiles, but not for the 
highest quartile, where SRISK is actually increased in the interaction 
model. 
Concerning the choice of credit risk model under Basel II, we observe 
differential effects again across the cross-section. While the passive 
standard and foundation approach, indicated by IRBA-S/F, did 
contribute to reduce systemic risk for the higher quartile banks, the 
more aggressive mixed and advanced models, IRBA-A/M, contributed to 
significantly increase SRISK. Moreover, within each quartile, the risk- 
enhancing effect of the aggressive risk models are even greater for the 
larger banks. On average, banks applying advanced or mixed internal 
models exhibit a higher level of SRISK. Moreover, the interaction terms 
show that the difference in SRISK between banks using internal models 
widens as size increases. The larger the bankis, the larger will be the 
effect on systemic risk for banks using advanced internal models. 
Taken together, we find that the process of Basel regulation did 
contribute to reduce systemic risk in the lower quartiles even in the early 
years, when the focus of regulation was more concentrated on micro- 
prudential concerns. Paradoxically, for the upper quartile the process 
effectively contributed to significant increases in capital shortfall 
(SRISK), even in the early years. Similarly we find differential effects 
across banking quartiles also for the introduction of internal models for 
market risk. Only in the case of internal credit risk models, we find a 
risk-enhancing effect across all quartiles and even stronger for larger 
banks within each quartile. 
Concerning the Basel III measures of globally systemically important 
banks, we verify that the G-SIB-allocation (G-SIB FE) is correlated with 
high SRISK-exposure progressively across quartiles. Moreover, the 
implementation of G-SIB-surcharges after 2012 (G-SIB) contributes to 
reduce capital shortfall, also progressively across quartiles. 
Also monetary policy affects financial stability differentially. While 
short-term interest rates (ST interest rates) uniformly related negatively 
with SRISK, measures of unconventional monetary policy (ECB Mon. 
Policy Assets) exert differential impact across banks. The ECB asset 
purchase programme seems to have a reducing effect on SRISK for the 
lower quartiles, but unconventional monetary policy measures are 
positively related with systemic risk for the riskiest quartile. 
The standard controls as well as the drivers of bank stock prices exert 
the expected results. Systematic risk, as measured by Beta, leverage and 
21 The firm misvaluation is estimated considering both firm-specific deviations 
from the valuation in the current sector, and sector deviations from long-run 
industry multiples.  
22 We have refrained from an explicit analysis of all individual buckets, 
because of low numbers of banks in some buckets as compared to the overall 
sample, especially in the highest buckets. Similarly, we rely on the BCBS 
identification and we do use alternative approaches such as Benoit et al. (2019). 
On one side, the BCBS identification allows us to use the full time series until its 
introduction. On the other side, comparing their scores with the BCBS scores, 
Benoit et al. (2019) observe that (i) the systemic-risk scores are very strongly 
correlated, with rank correlations greater than 90% and correlation with SRISK 
between 56% and 60%, (ii) there are far more cases of switching buckets than 
belonging to the SIFIs group (3 banks in 2015 and 1 in 2016). As we do not use 
the buckets information but refer to a single dummy for being a SIFIs or not, we 
will reduce the information in the new measure anyway while we already limit 
the issues of mis-classification. 
23 As many of the regulatory proxies in the literature are not going back to the 
past as our study would need or have lower frequency, we rely on country 
effects.  
24 The results are reported in the Appendix. 
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distance-to-default (opposite of Z-score), are positively correlated with 
the exposure to systemic risk measured by SRISK. 25 Size is related to 
higher capital shortfall as well as the market stress indicator for the 
highest quartile. Market overvaluation on the other hand is negatively 
related to capital shortfall only for the lower quartiles. Country effects 
are strong and significant.26 
These results are fairly robust with respect to different models, 
different measures of systematic risk or contribution to systemic risk not 
Table 1 
Unconditional quantile regressions of SRISK with basel time dummies.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 
L.SRISK 0.00531*** 0.0103*** 0.360*** 0.00494*** 0.00952*** 0.356***  
(0.000223) (0.000532) (0.00544) (0.000220) (0.000529) (0.00544) 
Beta 326.6*** 2164*** 8858*** 371.8*** 2262*** 9256***  
(12.28) (33.42) (200.5) (12.53) (34.70) (204.2) 
Z-score -2.018*** -3.882*** -60.90*** -2.039*** -4.002*** -61.02***  
(0.139) (0.246) (1.112) (0.139) (0.248) (1.121) 
LVG 16.13*** 32.88*** 86.31*** 16.92*** 34.75*** 93.15***  
(0.225) (0.394) (2.919) (0.224) (0.390) (2.984) 
G-SIB FE 730.8*** 2316*** 22,934*** 732.8*** 2323*** 22,949***  
(17.89) (36.84) (328.8) (17.72) (36.42) (327.5) 
G-SIB -600.3*** -1028*** -1620*** -607.5*** -1056*** -167***  
(20.30) (47.70) (486.5) (20.02) (47.02) (483.2) 
CISS -396.2*** -477.0*** 1538** -309.2*** -180.2** 2214***  
(49.00) (89.23) (643.8) (49.84) (90.59) (649.1) 
Market Return 922.4 1501 2565 1088 1858 4030  
(871.7) (1658) (11,744) (868.3) (1655) (11,707) 
ST interest rates -66.84*** -47.84*** -682.7*** -74.05*** -68.49*** -742.0***  
(4.323) (7.885) (53.93) (4.508) (8.349) (55.62) 
ECB Mon. Policy Assets -1.74e-05 -0.000141*** 1.62e-05 -2.49e-05** -0.000146*** -5.99e-05  
(1.06e-05) (2.24e-05) (0.000161) (1.05e-05) (2.24e-05) (0.000161) 
Misvaluation -801.5*** -618.4*** 43.86 -796.0*** -603.5*** 89.24  
(13.12) (19.09) (104.5) (13.14) (18.74) (103.7) 
MV (centered) -62.43*** 277.7*** 3050*** -196.9*** -143.8*** 1973***  
(6.954) (11.81) (80.84) (10.52) (17.60) (124.1) 
IRBA-S/F 180.1* -335.8** -2707*** 13.58 -1026*** -3897***  
(101.7) (161.5) (978.9) (104.0) (163.1) (995.4) 
IRBA-A/M 877.3*** 1418*** 9123*** 616.8*** 571.5*** 7063***  
(102.6) (164.7) (1008) (105.1) (166.8) (1029) 
IRBA-S/F # MV    128.5*** 589.8*** 869.7***     
(14.40) (24.33) (156.6) 
IRBA-A/M # MV    450.3*** 970.1*** 3982***     
(14.28) (30.79) (277.6) 
Jan1996- Jun2006 -912.2*** -1270*** 4633*** -828.8*** -1005*** 5298***  
(26.99) (55.42) (455.4) (27.67) (57.02) (456.7) 
Jun2006- Sep2008 -1187*** -1480*** 2265** -953.1*** -751.6*** 4145***  
(104.3) (169.8) (1070) (106.1) (171.0) (1079) 
Sep2008- Sep2010 -1268*** -1422*** -943.4 -1039*** -545.6*** 761.8  
(111.6) (184.3) (1191) (114.1) (187.5) (1208) 
Sep2010- Nov2014 -1299*** -1547*** 1100 -1037*** -587.5*** 3081***  
(110.3) (181.5) (1168) (113.2) (184.9) (1184) 
Nov2014- Dec2018 -1286*** -1279*** 1689 -1030*** -337.9* 3622***  
(111.9) (185.3) (1195) (114.7) (188.6) (1211) 
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 685.0*** -1048*** -9601*** 539.5*** -1480*** -10,787***  
(42.18) (83.73) (594.9) (43.47) (86.51) (602.0) 
Observations 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.352 0.467 0.591 0.357 0.473 0.592 
RMSE 1528 2870 21476 1522 2855 21,441 
Percentile -20.2819 1065.176 8999.354 -20.2819 1065.176 8999.354 
Norm. RMSE 75.34 2.69 2.39 75.04 2.68 2.38 
aThis table reports the results from the.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of weekly SRISK (Firpo et al., 2009). We include two bank-level IRBA dummies 
(IRBA-S/F (standardized and foundation IRBA) and IRBA-A/M (mixed and advanced IRBA) with (models 1–3) and without interaction (models 4–6) with demeaned 
market capitalization. We include five time dummies identifying the Basel process: “Market Risk Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), “Basel II" (1: between 
June 2006 and September 2008), “Basel III" (1: between September 2008 and September 2010), and “Banking Union" (1: after November 2014). We also include a time 
dummy to isolate the effect of the “European Crisis", taking value 1 between September 2010 to November 2014. We control for country effects and lagged explanatory 
variables, in order: lagged SRISK, market Beta, Z-score and leverage ratio, Global Systemically Important Banks dummies (a fixed effect dummy and an annual 
dummy), CISS measure of market stress, MSCI equity index, short-term interest rates, assets held by ECB for monetary policy purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s 
equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the demeaned market capitalization.RMSE is reported as normalized by the respective percentile. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
25 Accordingly, price bubbles in bank stocks are stabilizing according to our 
SRISK measure. This may be seen as a limiting feature in using SRISK for pre-
dictive purposes. Nevertheless the measure is forceful in backward looking ex- 
post evaluations across longer periods. 
26 The country effects relate to differential country-specific supervision as well 
as country-specific economic performance. Since we do not further separate 
those forces we do not present the details, which are available from the authors 
upon demand. 
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reported here.27 This evidence stands in stark contrast to the original 
goals of the Basel Committee in strengthening the safety and soundness 
of the whole banking system. 
In sum, we find no evidence that the introduction of internal models 
introduced in 2006 did succeed in increasing bank resiliency. The 
discretion given to the regulated banks apparently, while in compliance 
with regulation, did not stop banks from engaging in (sophisticated) 
risk-taking activities.28 
Our results agree well with the findings of Behn et al. (2016b), which 
was conducted only for German banks. We take a European perspective 
and relate the impact of credit risk models to the impact of market risk 
models. It turns out that market risk models had a small but stabilizing 
effect in contrast to credit risk models. Taking a distributional approach, 
we find that the risk-enhancing effect of internal models for credit risk 
Table 2 
Unconditional quantile regressions of Z-Score.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 
L.Z-score 0.105*** 0.271*** 0.954*** 0.105*** 0.271*** 0.954***  
(0.00386) (0.00700) (0.0197) (0.00386) (0.00704) (0.0197) 
Beta 2.093*** 0.0411 -6.460*** 2.124*** 0.120 -6.703***  
(0.433) (0.667) (1.584) (0.434) (0.672) (1.604) 
SRISK -3.75e-05*** -4.74e-05*** -0.000297*** -3.76e-05*** -4.77e-05*** -0.000295***  
(7.76e-06) (1.28e-05) (3.09e-05) (7.79e-06) (1.27e-05) (3.09e-05) 
LVG -0.0977*** -0.0883*** -0.0860*** -0.0972*** -0.0868*** -0.0890***  
(0.00580) (0.00774) (0.0167) (0.00581) (0.00776) (0.0170) 
G-SIB FE 6.589*** -0.771 -2.921 6.604*** -0.728 -2.950  
(0.613) (0.952) (1.904) (0.614) (0.954) (1.906) 
G-SIB 1.312* 11.65*** 43.23*** 1.266* 11.52*** 43.29***  
(0.709) (1.592) (4.204) (0.707) (1.584) (4.212) 
CISS 2.452 1.395 10.55 2.950* 2.760 9.959  
(1.549) (2.619) (6.966) (1.557) (2.619) (7.008) 
Market Return 97.29 -52.24 -233.9 90.91 -69.30 -213.3  
(100.0) (158.1) (395.5) (100.2) (158.1) (395.4) 
ST interest rates -0.0218 0.0805 -1.102*** -0.0446 0.0188 -1.051***  
(0.101) (0.136) (0.277) (0.102) (0.137) (0.274) 
ECB Mon.policy Assets 1.32e-06*** -2.77e-07 6.43e-08 1.37e-06*** -1.53e-07 8.78e-08  
(3.65e-07) (6.08e-07) (1.74e-06) (3.65e-07) (6.10e-07) (1.75e-06) 
MV (centered) -0.390* 0.806** 3.966*** -0.994*** -0.837* 5.095***  
(0.217) (0.333) (0.772) (0.374) (0.506) (0.975) 
IRBA-S/F 0.710 0.367 -15.88*** 0.487 -0.245 -15.58***  
(0.666) (1.435) (5.396) (0.665) (1.426) (5.418) 
IRBA-A/M 5.254*** 14.64*** 5.451 5.145*** 14.36*** 6.132  
(0.696) (1.483) (5.617) (0.701) (1.488) (5.668) 
IRBA-S/F # MV    1.292*** 3.546*** -1.566     
(0.469) (0.697) (1.546) 
IRBA-A/M # MV    0.399 1.021 -2.565     
(0.503) (0.798) (2.089) 
Jan1996- Jun2006 1.729* 1.985* -1.292 2.127** 3.068** -2.037  
(0.927) (1.187) (1.628) (0.957) (1.226) (1.687) 
Jun2006- Sep2008 4.817*** 6.449*** 26.28*** 4.709*** 6.130*** 25.79***  
(1.279) (2.148) (6.254) (1.289) (2.165) (6.286) 
Sep2008- Sep2010 3.754** 5.633** 26.19*** 4.218*** 6.891*** 25.24***  
(1.470) (2.402) (6.926) (1.496) (2.431) (6.986) 
Sep2010- Nov2014 4.137*** 5.038** 27.84*** 4.654*** 6.442*** 26.79***  
(1.363) (2.161) (6.249) (1.396) (2.202) (6.345) 
Nov2014- Dec2018 2.918** 4.511* 26.87*** 3.361** 5.713** 25.93***  
(1.467) (2.326) (6.609) (1.488) (2.358) (6.692) 
Country Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 6.935*** 18.37*** -1.875 6.363*** 16.81*** -0.774  
(1.244) (1.803) (3.309) (1.281) (1.852) (3.410) 
Observations 7489 7489 7489 7489 7489 7489 
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.339 0.435 0.582 0.340 0.437 0.582 
RMSE 13.89 21.36 50.26 13.88 21.32 50.26 
Percentile 10.00 21.13 46.19 10.00 21.13 46.19 
Norm.RMSE 1.389 1.011 1.088 1.388 1.009 1.088 
a This table reports the results from the quarterly.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of Z-score (Fiordelisi and Marques-Ibanez, 2013). We include the 
bank-level IRBA dummies (categories IRBA-S/F and IRBA-A/M) with (models 1–3) and without interaction (models 4–6) with demeaned market capitalization. We 
include five time dummies identifying the Basel process: “Market Risk Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), “Basel II" (1: between June 2006 and September 
2008), “Basel III" (1: between September 2008 and September 2010), and “Banking Union" (1: after November 2014). We also include a time dummy to isolate the 
effect of the “European Crisis", taking value 1 between September 2010 to November 2014. We control for country effects and lagged explanatory variables, in order: 
market Beta, SRISK, leverage ratio, Global Systemically Important Banks dummies (a fixed effect dummy and an annual dummy), CISS measure of market stress, MSCI 
equity index, short-term interest rates, assets held by ECB for monetary policy purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the 
demeaned market capitalization. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
27 The Appendix reports some of these results. In particular, it reports the 
results from the quantile regression of Delta CoVaR in Table 12 with a similar 
main result: mixed and advanced IRB models contribute positively to systemic 
risk exposure across the whole distribution. 
28 The next Section 5 aims at showing the robustness of these results in a 
counterfactual analysis. 
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are increasing in the systemical importance of banks; in larger and more 
systemic banks, internal models contribute more strongly to an increase 
in SRISK of European banks and across risk classes. Moreover, we find 
evidence for heterogeneity in the supervisory approach across European 
countries. Based on our results, the concerns raised about Basel II by 
Danielson et al. (2001) are validated by the data. By neglecting the 
endogeneity of systemic risk, Basel II regulation did not succeed to 
reduce systemic risk precisely in those sectors that turned out to become 
the most vulnerable ones. 
Moreover, the implementation of Basel II in July 2006 has contrib-
uted to the build-up of systemic risk with the larger banks contributing 
even more. This finding contradicts the hypothesis of Hakenes and 
Schnabel (2011), who on the basis of theoretical considerations argue 
that the IRB-approach of Basel II induces smaller and medium-sized 
banks to take larger risks in order to compete more effectively with 
larger banks employing the IRB-approach. We find that their basic 
assumption that IRB contributes positively to larger banks is not sup-
ported by the data.29 
In summary, the intended consequences of the Basel regulation were 
achieved only for the safer banks, but, ironically, they were missed out 
for the riskier banks. Obviously, banks’ strategic incentives were not 
properly understood and the substitutability between capital rules and 
state guarantees was seriously underestimated throughout the various 
stages of the Basel process. Consequently, it was especially the system-
ically important European banks that were ill prepared to deal with the 
subprime crisis in 2007 and even more in the subsequent European 
sovereign crisis. These unbalanced developments across the cross- 
section of banks continue to hold even under the ongoing Basel III re-
forms that arguably focus more on macro-prudential concerns. 
4.2. Sources of individual bank risk 
Since it has often been argued that, pre-crisis, the Basel process was 
focused on micro-prudential regulation targeted towards individual 
bank risk rather than macro-prudential concerns, it may seem instruc-
tive to analyse individual bank failure risk on its own, rather than sys-
temic risk. The evolution of the trajectories of Z-score across different 
risk classes of banks already indicates that it might be illuminating to 
analyze the policy effects on individual bank risk by means of quantile 
regressions as well. Table 2 reports the results of the quantile regressions 
of Z-score. 
As in our analysis of systemic risk in the previous section, we find 
differential effects of policy variables across the cross-section of banks, 
although the differences seem less pronounced. While market risk 
models (Jan1996-Jun2006) did increase resiliency at the lower riskiest 
quartile, the effect in the highest safest quartile are insignificant. Like-
wise, the other time dummies show an improvement in resiliency over 
the Basel process across the riskiest banks in the lowest quantile. 
Looking at the internal model implementation, we observe a similar 
decrease in insolvency risk among the riskiest banks if internal models 
are used. The aggressive mixed and advanced credit risk models (IRBA- 
A/M) contributed to increase the resiliency in the riskiest quartiles at the 
average size firm. On the other hand, the passive models (IRBA-S/F) are 
related to increased insolvency risk in the largest safest quartile, while it 
is related to higher resiliency for the largest and safest banks in the lower 
quartiles. Moreover, the G-SIB-capital surcharges contribute positively 
to enhancing resiliency across the full cross-section. 
The standard bank characteristics are related to insolvency risk as 
expected. Leverage (LVG) enhances insolvency risk across all quartiles. 
Moreover, country are strong and significant. 
Interestingly, the correlation with interest rates (ST interest rates) is 
ambiguous across the distribution. The level of interest rates is nega-
tively related to resiliency in the highest quartile, while it is insignificant 
in the lower quartile. This implies that a low interest rate monetary 
policy is positively related to the resiliency of the already safest banks in 
the upper quartiles, but is unrelated in the lowest quartiles of risky in-
stitutions. Asset purchases (ECB Mon.policy Asset), on the other hand, 
correlate positively with the resiliency of the already risky banks in the 
lowest quartile. 
Fig. 6. Credit Risk Internal Models and SRISK. We report 
the evolution of the daily estimated SRISK (Equation 3), 
distinguishing for the usage of credit risk internal models 
(IRBA). We identify banks according to the approach used 
at the last available date. We distinguish banks applying 
standardized or foundation approaches (blue line), and 
banks applying advanced or mixed approaches (red line). 
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this 
article.)   
29 Even if the competitive effect of Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) is relevant at 
all, our evidence suggests that the direct (negative) implications for banks’ risk 
management are dominant. However, our findings about the effects of internal 
models suggest that the assumption of an increase in resiliency or the largest 
banks due to the use of risk-models is not supported by the data. In this regard, 
also (Colliard, 2015) has investigated theoretically the impact of internal 
models on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. 
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4.3. The Basel process 
In summary, our findings both on systemic and individual banking 
risk are rather mixed. While internal models benefit the less risky banks 
in our sample in terms of idiosyncratic resiliency, they contribute to 
reducing the perceived stability of the systemically important banks. 
Overall, it is fair to say that we cannot find evidence in favor of internal 
credit risk models contributing to a general increase in safety and 
soundness of the European banking system. 
Moreover, our results also provide a mixed picture about the overall 
effect of the Basel process on bank resiliency. This is true both on the 
dimension of micro-prudential concerns, measured by z-score, as well as 
on macro-prudential concerns, measured by capital shortfall SRISK. By 
way of summarizing, the Basel process has been rather successful in 
enhancing the resiliency of the less risky banks, both in terms of indi-
vidual insolvency risk as well as in terms of exposure to systemic risk. 
However, the account is quite different for the most risky banks. Our 
analysis suggests that even early policy measures such as the market risk 
amendment as well as, and in particular, the extension of internal model 
for credit risk are associated with a decrease of resiliency, both in terms 
of individual banking risk as well as systemic risk. On the other hand, the 
G-SIB capital surcharges of Basel III tend to be related positively to 
resiliency. 
As a byproduct of our analysis we also find that the introduction of 
Banking Union as well as instruments of monetary policy differentially 
exert stronger correlations with capital shortfall of systemic banks 
relative to less systemic banks. 
5. The role of internal credit risk models 
As we have seen in the previous section, advanced internal models 
are strongly correlated with capital shortfall. Therefore, it seems 
important to investigate the risk measures around the implementation 
date. We apply a difference-in-differences approach in conjunction with 
Table 3 
PSM and difference-in-differences.  
A.PROBIT PSM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.SRISK -0.00000438** -0.00000325* -0.000021*** -0.0000035* -0.0000185***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Beta 0.26498*** 0.1413*** 0.2331*** 0.14207*** 0.0067453  
(0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0217) (0.0244) 
Z-score -0.0060*** -0.0045*** -0.0016*** -0.00458*** -0.0034628***  
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
LVG 0.01008*** 0.0096*** 0.00696*** 0.0095*** 0.0029***  
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
MV 0.000068*** 0.000072*** 0.000071*** 0.000072*** 0.000072***  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Misvaluation -0.0025 0.03091*** -0.08305*** 0.0303** 0.01989*  
(0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0118) 
CISS   0.1534 0.1247 1.26382***    
(0.1336) (0.1920) (0.1718) 
Market Return   0.0356 -0.0332 -0.3734178    
(1.4153) (1.5724) (1.7704) 
ST interest rates   0.0774*** 0.0063*** 0.01483**    
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0066) 
ECB monetary policy assets   -0.00000031*** -0.000002*** 0.0000015***    
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
HUR     0.15646***      
0.0045239 
PPI     -0.0217***      
0.0038617 
QGDP     0.0209935      
0.0153126 
Constant -0.2299*** 0.21091*** -0.50355*** 0.1683** -2.0087***  
(0.0318) (0.0710) (0.0291) (0.0795) (0.0596) 
Country effects yes yes no yes no 
Year effects no yes no yes no 
Number of observations 36,175 36,175 40,568 36,111 22,801 
Pseudo R2 0.2601 0.2766 0.1715 0.277 0.1607 
B.DIFF.-IN-DIFFERENCES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Before 2006      
Control 7859 12,703 6707 12,820 8054 
Treated 4541 4336 6176 4341 6135 
Diff (T-C) -3318 -8367 -531 -8479 -1919  
(6118.19) (9047.51) (5058.25) (9082.11) (5538.00) 
After 2006      
Control 7631 2987 3083 2189 2180 
Treated 17,599 24,448 29,423 20,834 27,409 
Diff (T-C) 9968 21,461*** 26,340*** 18,645*** 25,229***  
(7420.37) (7505.99) (6892.16) (6054.69) (6986.00) 
Diff-in-Diff 13,286.01*** 29,828.56*** 26,870.61*** 27,124.21*** 27,148.290***  
(4527.87) (9891.47) (6912.34) (9666.79) (7856.176) 
Number of observations 70388 70433 84233 69718 69,937 
R-square 0.056 0.099 0.14 0.108 0.122 
1This table reports the results from the Propensity Score Matching probit regressions (Frame A) and the difference-in-differences analysis (Frame B) on banks with 
internal credit risk models (Advanced or Mixed approaches) versus comparable banks without IRBA, before and after the regulatory change in 2006. Propensity Score 
is estimated via probit regression, where the probability of implementing IRBA is explained by lagged SRISK, market beta, Z-score, leverage ratio, market capitali-
zation, misvaluation (models 1–2), CISS, market return, short-term interest rates (model 3–4), and country macro variables such as harmonized unemployement rate, 
PPI, and quarterly GDP growth (model 5). We report robust standard errors, clustered per firm. *** 0.01; **0.05; *0.10. 
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propensity score matching to estimate the contribution of IRBA models 
on the systemic risk exposure of the banks opting for the internal model 
approach. More specifically, we consider treatment as the imple-
mentation of IRBA for credit risk, so that treated banks are those that use 
either foundation or mixed/advanced internal models, while the un-
treated banks are the ones applying the standardized regulatory 
approach. We apply a propensity score matching in order to assign 
comparable control banks to each treated institution. 
A naive parallel comparison of SRISK is shown in Fig. 6. We observe 
how banks that opted for advanced or mixed IRBA after 2006 (IRBA-A/ 
M) always had a higher level of SRISK. However, their systemic risk 
exposure sharply increases after Basel II allows them to use IRBA.30 
Applying a difference-in-differences analysis, we discriminate between 
treated versus control banks, before and after Basel II implementation on 
June 2006. 
In order to estimate the counterfactual and reduce the selection bias, 
we identify a control group by kernel propensity score matching method 
(Rosenbaum et al., 1983). Based on the above observations we run a 
probit regression to estimate the probability of implementing IRBA 
models given a set of observable characteristics and assign a propensity 
score to balance the treated and the comparison groups. We will 
therefore use these variables as observable characteristics to match 
treated versus untreated firms, besides the explanatory variables we 
used in the previous section (lagged SRISK, Z-score, leverage ratio, 
market misvaluation and macro variables).31 
Thus, we estimate a difference-in-differences weighted regression, 
where observations are weighted to ensure that each group reflects the 
covariate distribution in the pre-Basel II period. The outcome variable is 
SRISK, and we include the covariates we have previously found as 
important drivers of SRISK: 
SRISKit = λ0 + IRBAλ1 + BaselIIλ2 + BaselII*IRBAλ3 + Z′λz + X′λx + εit
(9)  
where IRBA is the dummy variable identifying banks with advanced or 
mixed credit risk internal models, Basel II is the time dummy capturing 
changes after the implementation of Basel II, and Basel II * IRBA is the 
interaction term identifying IRBA banks after June 2006. Xt and Zit 
include the bank and market regressors as in previous Section. 
The difference-in-differences parameter is therefore: 
σ̂3 = (SRISKIRBA,post − SRISKIRBA,pre) − (SRISKnonIRBA,post − SRISKnonIRBA,pre)
(10) 
This method allows us to remove both potential biases in the post- 
Basel period between the treated and the control groups that could 
result from permanent differences between banks, and potential biases 
from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could result 
from other changes. 
We report the results on the mean regression. The treated group 
comprises banks that did implement internal credit risk models after the 
regulatory option is made available by Basel II in June 2006. Table 3 
reports the results for the probit regression for the PSM (frame A) and 
the difference-in-differences estimation (frame B). The bank- 
characteristics that were used before throughout our analysis appear 
to importantly affect the choice of implementing internal models, in line 
with the probit regression results in frame A. 
The propensity score method provides the weights for the weighted 
difference-in-differences regression. The results strongly support our 
hypothesis that exposure to systemic risk is strongly associated to the use 
of internal credit risk models. While there are no significant differences 
in SRISK between treatment and control groups prior to the imple-
mentation of Basel II standards, we find strong and significant differ-
ences in risk exposure after their introduction in 2006. In the follow-up 
period, we see that institutions that have chosen to implement credit risk 
models as either advanced or mixed approaches, have increased signif-
icantly more in exposure to systemic risk in the post-Basel II period 
compared to the peer group. 
6. Conclusions 
We document a steady increase in the systemic risk exposure of 
European banks as measured by the capital shortfall measure SRISK 
within the past 30 years. While aggregate capital shortfall in the 1990 s 
was around 1% of national GDP it increased to about 4–5% of Eurozone 
GDP. This observations runs counter to intensive regulatory attempts to 
impose a floor on bank capitalization in a long process of regulating 
minimum capital. Our finding is complemented by the observation that 
virtually all commonly known systemic risk measures (e.g. those re-
ported by Giglio et al., 2016)) are upward trending over this period 
despite the fact that measures of individual banking risk such as z-score 
suggest a reduction in (individual) banking risk. The lion’s share of the 
increase in systemic risk occurs in the highest quintile of the size dis-
tribution of banks. For almost half of the banks in our sample, and 
certainly for the lower two quintiles, the various risk measures are 
increasing moderately or even remain roughly constant over the past 30 
years. 
While the Basel process of capital regulation was designed to in-
crease the stability and safety of the global banking system, our 
empirical evidence robustly suggests that it did not achieve this goal in 
its first three decades of operation for European banks. From the 
perspective of systemic risk measures, the Basel process has been more 
effective for smaller banks. But even there it did not significantly reduce 
systemic exposures or contagion risk. For the largest quantiles of banks, 
internal models might have provided strong incentives to carve out 
equity and, thus, reduce in-house resiliency. The evidence demonstrates 
that those incentives had been exploited and the resiliency of large and 
systemically important European banks had already become greatly 
impaired at the onset of the Great Financial Crisis. To the extent that 
most of the largest banks did engage in this activity of reducing their 
capital buffers, overall bank capital became scarce, generating systemic 
concerns for the whole banking sector. But even 10 years later most 
individual - and thus also aggregate - SRISK scores did not retreat to pre- 
crises levels or even below.32 
30 The seemingly strange pattern of foundation-IRBA is due to the fact that 
banks entered gradually into internal modelling, therefore the foundation 
approach was a first intermediate step for banks that consequently moved on to 
implement advanced approaches.  
31 Further support for our choice of propensity score matching is provided by 
the change in business models incentivized by Basel II. Because of data limi-
tations in SNL bank coverage, we have to restrict our analysis to observations 
from 2005 onwards, and we do not report the results. Scrutinizing bank char-
acteristics, we observe that banks that use a mixed or advanced approach tend 
to be the largest firms in terms of Tier-1 capital. However, at the same time they 
exhibit the strongest increase in their non-performing loans ratios, while, 
seemingly paradoxically, holding the lowest level of total equity. In terms of 
risk weights their trajectory follows closely the trajectory of banks with the 
standardized approach after 2010. 
32 This observation is consistent with attempts of ECB researchers (Homar 
et al., 2016) trying to empirically validate the ECB policy of focusing in 
particular on the European ECB and EBA stress scenarios rather than focusing 
on individual and aggregate capital shortfall for the Euro area as suggested by 
Acharya et al. (2014). 
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Controlling for balance sheet variables, the standard drivers of bank 
stock prices and macroeconomic indicators,33 our structural analysis of 
the drivers of SRISK strongly suggests that internal risk models were 
chosen strategically. Similar results have been derived by Behn et al. 
(2016b) on a sample of German banks and (Colliard, 2015). The stra-
tegic use of internal models is one major source of the depletion of bank 
equity (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). Ironically, these equity carve-outs 
were one way of increasing return on equity through extensive stock 
repurchases prior to the Great Financial Crisis at a time when the cost of 
bank equity was actually low, and strengthening capitalization and 
resiliency would have been relatively cheap (in historical context).34 
This observation may simply constitute a reflection of the leverage 
ratchet effect (see Admati et al., 2018). 
On the basis of our analysis it is not necessarily that capital rules per 
se were insufficient; it is rather the possibility to reduce effective capi-
talization by means of complex risk models under supervisory approval 
that causes the lack of resiliency. Our findings accord well with (Miles 
et al., 2012). They seem to contradict Jackson (2015) in the sense that 
simple models, even at sub-optimal levels in terms of efficiency, may be 
more suitable to limit risks and, hence, safeguard resiliency. 
While the political support for the use of internal models still is un-
broken in Europe, the heated debate on the conclusion of Basel III also 
reflects the need for a more critical perspective on self-regulatory in-
struments, and, hence, the need of limiting their potential misuse. The 
Basel Committee’s Consultative Document on credit risk models (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016) explicitly proposes to remove 
this self-regulatory option for exposures that do not allow for sufficiently 
reliable estimates, such as low-default exposures. This recommendation 
accords well with our empirical findings presented above. Surprisingly, 
in finalizing the Basel III agreement it was the European supervisors who 
were reluctant in curbing the use of mixed and advanced IRBA-models, 
while the original proponents of internal models under Basel II, namely 
the U.S. tried to phase them out.35 
We also suggest that, by concentrating on formal fulfilment of reg-
ulatory rules based on book values, regulators missed a pro-social role in 
interpreting (negative) market feedback. Relying on rules based on book 
values only, neglects social feedback and market expectations. However, 
trust and confidence are key in the banking industry, but they are 
notoriously difficult to measure. Hence, market-based risk measures are 
one simple step towards taking into account market reactions, trust and 
confidence, and hence systemic market feedback. This is potentially 
crucial information and supervisors should be challenged to explain 
more when and why they disregard market information.36 After all, 
supervision plays an important role to correct potential misbehavior 
only in market economies. This argument assumes the existence of a 
sufficiently high degree of trust in the operation of markets after all. If 
this trust cannot be assured in normal periods, why not economize on 
bureaucracy and centralize the whole banking system? 
Our analysis also uncovers disconcerting effects of monetary policy 
on banks’ contribution to systemic risk. This is particularly true for the 
less risky and typically smaller banks. Hence, we empirically verify that 
a low-growth environment creates incentives for risk-taking, and, 
therefore, an increase both in contagion risk and exposure to systemic 
risk. Accordingly, under the current regulatory framework, quantitative 
easing, through its effect on interest rates, contributes to undermining 
the stability and soundness of the European banking system.37 Inter-
estingly, these concerns do not affect the most systematically risky 
banks, which are tightly supervised in the first place. 
There are even wider implications of the Basel process of capital 
regulation beyond the banking industry on the whole financial sector. 
For example, the build-up of systematic risk in the insurance sector 
(Gehrig and Iannino, 2018), while not as dramatic as in the banking 
sector, also significantly moves upwards with a structural break around 
1996. Possibly these developments also exhibit unintended conse-
quences across markets and industries: long-term lending is increasingly 
given up by banks38 and taken over by the insurance sector. Hence, a 
final evaluation of the welfare consequences of the Basel process of 
capital regulation requires an analysis of the whole financial sector in 
order to not only account for market feedback, both in the regulated as 
well as the unregulated segments, but also for substitution effects and 
their implications on complementary activities. We leave this for future 
research. 
We also leave for future research the interaction between capital 
regulation and Banking Union. It is too early for a final judgement of 
Banking Union on the most systemic banks. However, at this stage we 
cannot detect any decline in the systemic risk scores for the banks under 
direct ECB supervision. Certainly, their SRISK remain well above the 
2008 levels still ten years later in 2018. 
It will be most interesting to compare the evolution of capital 
shortfall of European banks with their US counterparts, which after 
hefty forced re-capitalization now tend to be highly profitable, domi-
nating the global league tables again (Kuls, 2018). It may not come as a 
surprise to find that adequate capitalization in general also confers 
competitive advantage in global markets similar in spirit to the experi-
ence of the successful European turnarounds. 
A robust recommendation suggested by our work for policy makers 
and supervisors implies that all attempts to fix the capital shortfall and, 
hence, exposure to systemic risk of European banks have not been 
determined enough so far as to rebuild pre-crisis resiliency. In this sense, 
the pointed warning of John Vickers (Vickers, 2017) about the still 
dangerously high level of leverage extends well from British banks also 
to the European continent. 39 
Appendix A. Appendix 
Statistics 
(See Table 4–12). 
33 While we cannot completely rule out omitted variables, we make a large 
attempt to include all the known drivers of stock prices that crucially affect our 
endogenous variable SRISK plus additional country-specific macro-economic 
indicators. Moreover, the cross-sectoral heterogeneity does contribute impor-
tantly to identifying causal relationships between regulatory variables and 
SRISK. In addition we perform both a counter-factual simulation and a 
difference-in-differences analysis.  
34 Baron and Xiong (2014) provide a behavioural explanation based on 
over-optimism.  
35 The conclusion of Basel III at the Santiago de Chile Summit in November 
2016 failed because of disagreement about the proper output floor. While the U. 
S. insisted on a minimal role for internal models with an output floor of above 
80% the European supervisors pushed for an output floor of below 70%. The 
output floor provides a limit by which internal models can undercut the risk 
weights implied by the standard approach. In November 2017 a compromise 
was found at an output floor of 72.5%. 
36 This argument is not saying that there is no mispricing in markets. How-
ever, under normal conditions mispricing should be a short-term problem. In 
the long run markets should converge to fair valuations. For example, a market- 
to-book anomaly may occur for short periods; but when it persists for years or 
decades, the underlying sources of the anomaly may be important to remedy. 
37 Our findings suggests that quantitative easing would require complemen-
tary supervisory instruments to control adverse risk-taking incentives. In the 
case of Europe such complementary control was not effective for the period of 
our study.  
38 On the shortening of banks’ planing horizon see also (Boot and Ratnovski, 
2016).  
39 See the comment in the Financial Times (2018) by Arnold (2018)). 





Variable Frequency Description and Reference Database 
SRISK Daily Equation 13 (Brownlees and Engle, 2017; Acharya et al., 2012), where k = 0.08. Compustat Global, Datastream and 
Bundesbank, own calc. 
Delta CoVaR Daily Equation 8, estimated by quantile regression and empirical quantile at alpha= 0.05 (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2017). Compustat Global, Datastream and 
Bundesbank, own calc. 
Z-score Quarterly Equation 15 (Lepetit and Strobel, 2013) Compustat Global, own calc. 
Beta Daily Conditional dynamic market beta: ρim. * σi. ∕σm, where ρim, correlation coefficient between the bank’s and the market returns, is estimated by Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation model (Engel, 2002), and the volatilities σ are estimated by asymmetric GJR GARCH model (Glosten et al., 1993) 
Compustat Global and Datastream, own 
calc. 
Market Return Daily MSCI Europe index Datastream 
Stock return daily Bank’s log stock return Compustat Global own calc. 
Market value Daily (stock price * shares outstanding) standardized Compustat Global, own calc. 
Market-to-book Quarterly Market capitalization/Book equity (Daniel and Titman, 2006) Compustat Global, own calc. 
Misvaluation Quarterly Bank’s firm misvaluation, estimated as both firm-specific deviation from valuations implied by current sector, and deviations from long-run sector 
multiples (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) 
Compustat Global, own calc. 
Total Assets Quarterly Reported total assets Compustat Global 
Total Liabilities Quarterly Reported total liabilities Compustat Global 
Leverage (LVG) Quarterly (Total liabilities + Market capitalization) / Market capitalization Compustat Global, own calc. 
Deposits Annual Total Deposits / Total liabilities Compustat Global, own calc. 
Non-interest income Annual Non-interest income / Net Income Compustat Global, own calc. 
Non-performing assets Annual Non-performing assets / Total assets Compustat Global, own calc. 
Risk-adjusted capital 
ratio 
Annual Risk-adjusted capital ratio Compustat Global 
G-SIB FE Binary 1: a global systemically relevant institution as been defined as such at least once by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). FSB-BCBS, own calc. 
G-SIB Annual 1: bank is included in the list of G-SIBs by the FSB-BCBS FSB-BCBS, own calc. 
CISS Weekly Market stress indicator (Holló et al., 2012) ECB and authors 
Short Term (ST) interest 
rates 
Monthly Country interest rates based on three-month money market rates where available, or rates on similar financial instruments OECD 
Long Term (LT) interest 
rates 
Monthly Country interest rates referring to government bonds maturing in ten years OECD 
ECB monetary policy 
assets 
Annual Total assets held by the ECB for the asset purchase programmes ECB 
Unemployment rate 
(HUR) 
Monthly Country Harmonised unemployment rates as a percentage of civilian labour force OECD 
Producer Price Index 
(PPI) 
Monthly Country PPI, domestic manufacturing, annual growth in percentage OECD 
Quarterly GDP (QGDP) Quarterly Real GDP (constant prices) adjusted for seasonal influences, in percentage change from the previous quarter OECD 
Number of M&A per 
year 
Annual Annual number of mergers&acquisitions as reported by Compustat Global Compustat Global, own calc. 
IRBA Quarterly Internal Rating Based Approach used at bank-level. IRBA_S/F= 1: standardized or foundation approaches after June2006; IRBA_A/M= 1: mixed or 
advanced approaches after June2006 
SNL, central banks 
Basel I Binary 1: before 1996; 0: otherwise BCBS (July 1998), own calc. 
Market Risk 
Amendment 
Binary 1: 1996–1june2006; 0: otherwise BCBS (January 1996), own calc. 
Basel II Binary 1: 1june2006 to 1sept2008; 0: otherwise BCBS (June 2006), own calc. 
Basel III Binary 1: 1sept2008 to 1sep2010; 0: otherwise BCBS (September 2008), own calc. 
Sovereign European 
crisis 
Binary 1: 1sep2010 to 1nov2014; 0: otherwise own calc. 
Banking Union Binary 1: from 1nov2014; 0: otherwise CR (EU) No 1024/2013, own calc. 
aThis table reports detailed information on the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. It refers to the sources of the data and the data providers descriptions, when available. 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix.  
aThis table reports the correlation matrix between the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
T. Gehrig and M.C. Iannino                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of Financial Stability 55 (2021) 100904
18
Table 6 
Variable Summary Statistics by sub-periods.    
Mean SE mean p25 p50 p75 N 
Total SRISK  12902.19  99.9799  -20.28  1065.18  8999.35  101,711  
Beta  0.8483  0.0017  0.4394  0.7923  1.1691  101,711  
Delta CoVaR  0.0087  0.0000  0.0053  0.0076  0.0107  101,711  
Z-score  38.0801  0.1531  10.0034  21.1330  46.1940  100,820  
CAPR  14.5839  0.0231  11.4000  13.6000  16.6000  47,460  
LVG  27.4973  0.1073  8.4039  16.5865  31.3520  101,711  
MtB  5.9147  0.3913  0.6369  1.1024  1.8770  101,456  
Misvaluation  0.2320  0.0021  -0.1114  0.2525  0.5971  100,770  
MV  12560.86  77.5563  474.16  2338.72  11199.49  101,711  
MV (centered)  0.0000  0.0031  -0.7714  -0.1643  0.6207  101,711 
Basel I SRISK  4396.97  49.9067  659.35  2437.70  7245.93  9684  
Beta  0.8714  0.0037  0.6072  0.8609  1.1132  9684  
Delta CoVaR  0.0082  0.0000  0.0063  0.0080  0.0098  9684  
Z-score  15.6732  0.0906  8.4170  16.0849  21.9981  9197  
CAPR7  10.9386  0.0351  9.8000  10.7000  12.2000  1987  
LVG  21.9066  0.1460  13.4111  18.9761  28.1987  9684  
MtB  1.2977  0.0084  0.8844  1.1010  1.4708  9684  
Misvaluation  0.2362  0.0039  0.0632  0.2178  0.4157  9197  
MV  4915.17  54.0277  1217.19  2784.40  6816.23  9684  
MV (centered)  -1.0523  0.0038  -1.2815  -1.0434  -0.9196  9684 
Market Risk Amendment SRISK  5378.94  77.8927  -195.74  287.26  5456.72  34,464  
Beta  0.7180  0.0025  0.3503  0.6789  1.0361  34,464  
Delta CoVaR  0.0077  0.0000  0.0049  0.0068  0.0095  34,464  
Z-score  21.5541  0.1430  7.4325  13.9033  25.8403  34,333  
CAPR  12.3825  0.0246  10.7000  11.7000  13.3000  16,037  
LVG  17.9126  0.1134  6.2289  11.3362  21.2066  34,464  
MtB  15.1617  1.1504  1.0855  1.7167  2.5813  34,464  
Misvaluation  0.4928  0.0038  0.2321  0.5104  0.7855  34,320  
MV  12558.90  122.1151  477.70  2437.02  13514.81  34,464  
MV (centered)  -0.1741  0.0045  -0.7755  -0.3178  0.3321  34,464 
Basel II SRISK  15650.81  390.1472  -349.28  389.28  8242.02  9920  
Beta  0.8108  0.0043  0.4651  0.8131  1.0961  9920  
Delta CoVaR  0.0078  0.0000  0.0050  0.0070  0.0098  9920  
Z-score  43.9747  0.5137  12.5799  25.9318  56.2483  9920  
CAPR9  12.1698  0.0444  10.7000  11.7000  13.5000  2790  
LVG  19.6551  0.2653  6.0843  10.7152  21.2849  9920  
MtB  1.9472  0.0152  1.1768  1.7363  2.4540  9920  
Misvaluation  0.3920  0.0062  0.1518  0.4749  0.7454  9920  
MV  21713.28  359.6619  751.56  4766.06  24493.16  9920  
MV (centered)  1.3718  0.0104  0.6683  1.4569  2.1294  9920 
Basel III SRISK  24073.99  525.6244  89.34  1590.32  14405.69  9003  
Beta  0.8967  0.0059  0.4496  0.8007  1.2751  9003  
Delta CoVaR  0.0132  0.0001  0.0069  0.0104  0.0160  9003  
Z-score  45.1617  0.5437  12.8385  27.4082  55.9498  8977  
CAPR  12.1652  0.0951  10.1100  11.4000  12.7800  988  
LVG  38.8052  0.4919  10.7743  20.1679  45.6950  9003  
MtB  1.0124  0.0082  0.5451  0.8481  1.2830  8978  
Misvaluation  0.1375  0.0065  -0.2504  0.0634  0.4523  8927  
MV  11684.27  250.1816  409.12  2278.95  9613.10  9003  
MV (centered)  0.0029  0.0086  -0.5258  0.0053  0.5246  9003 
European Crisis SRISK  21634.75  309.4244  144.31  2316.05  16752.01  19,074  
Beta  1.0090  0.0045  0.5148  0.9143  1.3955  19,074  
Delta CoVaR  0.0096  0.0000  0.0056  0.0086  0.0122  19,074  
Z-score  49.1784  0.3871  14.3961  32.9161  61.2108  18,827  
CAPR  15.0440  0.0574  12.2500  14.4000  16.9900  9888  
LVG  40.4968  0.3234  11.9368  24.7335  48.8942  19,074  
MtB  0.9250  0.0066  0.4156  0.7070  1.1213  18,844  
Misvaluation  0.0439  0.0043  -0.2784  0.0407  0.3676  18,840  
MV  12318.13  188.7992  333.25  1629.59  9265.94  19,074  
MV (centered)  -0.0210  0.0058  -0.6101  -0.1255  0.5243  19,074 
Banking Union SRISK  15316.34  218.9442  94.41  1612.80  12384.42  19,566  
Beta  0.9064  0.0042  0.4429  0.8593  1.2411  19,566  
Delta CoVaR  0.0082  0.0000  0.0052  0.0074  0.0103  19,566  
Z-score  60.6941  0.4670  15.5905  37.2711  72.4498  19,566  
CAPR  17.5718  0.0415  14.4000  16.6000  19.3300  15,770  
LVG  33.2472  0.2714  11.6652  20.3025  38.6810  19,566  
MtB  0.9783  0.0080  0.3928  0.7027  1.0748  19,566  
Misvaluation  -0.0842  0.0046  -0.3610  -0.0526  0.2459  19,566  
MV  12348.17  177.5327  320.46  2042.30  9896.64  19,566  
MV (centered)  0.1512  0.0065  -0.5498  0.0637  0.7742  19,566 
a This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables of interest categorized by the subperiods identifying the Basel process: "Basel I" (1: before 1996) out, we 
include: "Market Risk Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), "Basel II" (1: between June 2006 and September 2008), "Basel III" (1: between September 2008 
and September 2010), "European Crisis" (1: between September 2010 to November 2014), and "Banking Union" (1: after November 2014). 
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Table 8 
Banks with internal models.  
Company Name Country IRBA SRISK Delta CoVaR Z-score Beta MV MtB 
Autobank AUT  1  23.041  0.001852581  68.4480896  0.418244481  13.05746841  0.515318871 
Bank fur Tirol und Vorarlberg AUT  3  234.029  0.004863943  57.63896561  0.318704754  536.9927979  0.950202286 
Erste Group Bank AUT  3  10919.071  0.013550359  27.25626564  1.208350539  13297.46191  1.279897809 
Immigon Portfolioabbau AUT  1  4333.295  0.000619655  2.868360996  0.238174513  39.97393036  0.022140071 
Oberbank AUT  1  207.406  0.00602958  122.115715  0.290880948  1294.011353  1.048346162 
Raiffeisen Intern. Bank Holding AUT  3  3829.667  0.01428062  33.67729568  1.4791677  10237.65527  1.699620247 
UniCredit Bank AUT  3  2485.126  0.006444126  18.54312897  0.608624697  19205.41797  1.600041628 
Volksbank AUT  2  199.398  0.002114616  41.58185577  0.244797722  32.66580963  0.199353307 
Wiener Privatbank AUT  1  -46.749  0.002261561  13.40207863  0.172883973  69.7926712  1.387899041 
Dexia BEL  1  36550.840  0.003969931  11.26284027  1.133173108  11356.44727  0.918165982 
KBC Group BEL  3  13569.836  0.012023639  19.17169571  1.175006151  19918.9668  2.863557816 
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise CHE  1  93.729  0.007376321  31.00448799  0.492326915  3173.183838  1.223238826 
Bellevue Group CHE  1  -269.136  0.007435598  14.96991539  0.444752932  410.6170349  1.715031624 
Credit Suisse Group CHE  3  41318.988  0.013495322  17.7419796  1.145028234  40774.13281  1.303631783 
Glarner Kantonalbank CHE  3  166.251  0.00225764  251.4246826  0.177800402  252.1076355  0.825312495 
Luzerner Kantonalbank CHE  1  -190.749  0.006635404  192.6670837  0.244047984  2404.594971  1.74032867 
(continued on next page) 
Table 7 
Variable summary statistics by IRBA categories.    
Mean SE mean p25 p50 p75 N 
Total SRISK  21270.70  204.6984  137.78  2496.10  18709.70  41,952  
Beta  0.9698  0.0030  0.4812  0.9245  1.3347  41,952  
Delta CoVaR  0.0095  0.0000  0.0054  0.0082  0.0119  41,952  
Z-score  50.0155  0.2595  15.0274  33.0451  62.9322  41,679  
CAPR  16.1584  0.0367  13.0000  15.2700  17.9000  23,890  
LVG  35.6705  0.1971  11.8296  21.8301  41.4966  41,952  
MtB  1.0087  0.0046  0.4639  0.7727  1.2141  41,697  
Misvaluation  0.0747  0.0029  -0.2309  0.0557  0.3792  41,646  
MV  13262.20  124.9815  415.25  2500.49  13122.06  41,952  
MV (centered)  0.1831  0.0044  -0.5041  0.0993  0.7771  41,952 
Advanced IRB SRISK  5696.07  488.9463  207.96  504.96  879.08  1311  
Beta  0.5792  0.0100  0.3130  0.5321  0.7555  1311  
Delta CoVaR  0.0071  0.0001  0.0046  0.0060  0.0078  1311  
Z-score  55.0997  0.7845  37.4176  52.3333  69.4258  1311  
CAPR  31.7361  0.5628  13.9000  38.8000  42.1000  570  
LVG  21.4334  0.5732  11.4080  14.2386  27.4385  1311  
MtB  1.6084  0.0179  0.8616  1.8081  2.1077  1311  
Misvaluation  0.4692  0.0077  0.3009  0.4895  0.6489  1311  
MV  4115.84  300.8268  737.83  1419.82  1650.01  1311  
MV (centered)  -0.1507  0.0237  -0.9420  -0.0605  0.4631  1311 
Foundation IRB SRISK  1292.76  78.8712  205.21  534.17  945.86  2699  
Beta  0.4150  0.0049  0.2416  0.3673  0.5247  2699  
Delta CoVaR  0.0058  0.0001  0.0038  0.0055  0.0071  2699  
Z-score  131.2014  1.5101  59.4071  106.0833  200.1949  2699  
CAPR  18.2967  0.1431  14.5000  16.9900  19.8800  1470  
LVG  55.9720  0.8436  19.1654  43.4757  96.2656  2699  
MtB  0.5958  0.0135  0.1007  0.1583  0.7861  2699  
Misvaluation  -0.4425  0.0126  -1.1192  -0.3802  0.0362  2699  
MV  2337.68  143.2382  130.72  212.78  626.16  2699  
MV (centered)  0.1370  0.0153  -0.4239  0.1246  0.6049  2699 
Mixed SRISK  41410.02  365.5722  4239.35  18043.84  55093.01  20,376  
Beta  1.2530  0.0040  0.9053  1.2209  1.5564  20,376  
Delta CoVaR  0.0120  0.0001  0.0078  0.0104  0.0145  20,376  
Z-score  43.4396  0.2284  19.2012  36.5626  60.5398  20,194  
CAPR  16.0789  0.0389  13.5800  15.6000  18.0000  14,156  
LVG  39.5242  0.2722  16.9964  25.5449  44.5354  20,376  
MtB  0.7375  0.0029  0.4455  0.6810  0.9703  20,210  
Misvaluation  0.0534  0.0031  -0.1894  0.0466  0.2769  20,210  
MV  24679.08  227.0739  2902.64  11708.36  38700.31  20,376  
MV (centered)  0.2570  0.0059  -0.3759  0.2433  0.8409  20,376 
Standardized SRISK  2141.70  74.5968  -58.63  79.20  2132.26  17,566  
Beta  0.7557  0.0040  0.3620  0.6552  1.0477  17,566  
Delta CoVaR  0.0073  0.0000  0.0042  0.0063  0.0093  17,566  
Z-score  44.6939  0.4390  9.3248  21.4279  53.2753  17,475  
CAPR  14.7422  0.0518  12.1100  14.2100  16.8100  7694  
LVG  29.1437  0.3090  6.4687  13.5834  33.1193  17,566  
MtB  1.3411  0.0095  0.5569  0.9333  1.6470  17,477  
Misvaluation  0.1498  0.0054  -0.2376  0.0850  0.5456  17,426  
MV  2380.14  44.5111  110.20  555.82  2416.29  17,566  
MV (centered)  0.1292  0.0075  -0.6024  -0.1181  0.7476  17,566 
a This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables of interest categorized by the IRB approach used by the banks in the sub-sample of 99 institutions. 
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Table 8 (continued ) 
Company Name Country IRBA SRISK Delta CoVaR Z-score Beta MV MtB 
Thurgauer Kantonalbank CHE  1  1325.654  0.002293671  258.9310303  0.154421479  285.9465332  0.140479714 
UBS Group CHE  3  57273.078  0.01496035  19.4371357  1.128180981  59205.32813  1.687543154 
VZ Holding CHE  1  -706.296  0.008132474  13.11054039  0.480005682  1110.495361  5.684613228 
Aareal Bank DEU  3  3403.045  0.013246361  38.98952103  1.285407305  1495.167969  0.621584356 
Albis Leasing DEU  1  52.682  0.002694323  3.007898569  0.470858097  38.0227356  2.124166012 
Baader Bank DEU  1  -86.570  0.007239574  23.81607819  0.811124325  193.1775208  1.118269563 
Berliner Effektengesellschaft DEU  1  -105.909  0.004835101  25.52674103  0.570054889  162.8542786  4.009314537 
Comdirect Bank DEU  3  114.087  0.009639773  57.23443604  0.909302294  1497.35022  2.810607433 
Commerzbank DEU  3  45573.902  0.012304731  40.9186554  1.344037533  13014.90137  0.70072341 
Deutsche Bank DEU  3  117268.156  0.014660357  28.43572044  1.377972484  39179.44922  1.043306351 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank DEU  1  2871.346  0.004473527  47.04047775  0.254683971  535.7086182  0.82724154 
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank DEU  3  3865.717  0.003315037  17.97112465  0.551209152  566.2906494  0.542690694 
Grenke DEU  1  -559.290  0.008362943  144.5006104  0.761498928  1160.34668  2.829248428 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt DEU  2  -481.600  0.004143512  115.561821  0.324846148  3083.888428  2.29980731 
Hypo Real Estate Holding DEU  1  25885.676  0.00945323  7.34711647  1.169630885  5010.333008  1.241012454 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank DEU  1  2478.336  0.004793256  6.4001894  0.68090111  1054.213745  0.750313699 
Landesbank Berlin Holding DEU  1  9586.322  0.004991849  9.662435532  0.506529748  5154.123047  1.683634043 
Merkur Bank DEU  1  51.134  0.00497785  78.7897644  0.314741611  34.37699127  0.567407727 
Net-M Privatbank 1891 DEU  1  -2.124  0.004034504  2.21822834  0.406870693  10.83274174  2.665394306 
Oldenburgische Landesbank DEU  3  132.606  0.004861035  57.57830429  0.286489248  1191.303467  1.867131829 
Quirin Privatbank DEU  1  -34.035  0.008590111  23.63336945  0.450006068  99.3963623  1.906875968 
BBVA ESP  3  18840.369  0.013812874  41.48424149  1.248331308  46506.73438  1.774502039 
Banco De Sabadell ESP  3  5265.362  0.012423779  57.59740067  0.983117819  8482.126953  1.250335217 
Banco Guipuzcoano ESP  3  -87.433  0.007320781  54.31272125  0.446093559  1269.119141  1.980062962 
Bankia ESP  3  17385.393  0.002680334  6.023930073  1.455013752  12322.42383  0.831365228 
Bankinter ESP  3  1779.991  0.011388439  62.59482574  1.057143211  4316.850098  1.848767877 
Caixabank ESP  3  5045.877  0.016968776  33.01026154  1.094476104  20657.65234  0.867110908 
Liberbank ESP  1  3315.326  0.007227283  7.334450722  1.237219334  1521.582153  0.591811538 
Aktia Bank FIN  3  695.143  0.011340129  62.98997116  0.557579279  485.1654358  0.728201091 
Nordea Bank FIN  3  28336.531  0.014689432  93.36885071  1.206091285  35798.41016  1.420097351 
BNP Paribas FRA  3  111763.102  0.014243565  40.85964584  1.363934636  60769.00781  1.038239241 
Boursorama FRA  3  -251.601  0.007744845  35.66352463  0.766729891  800.8115845  1.466428399 
CRCAM Ille et Vilaine FRA  2  633.499  0.007740303  126.2689972  0.358111501  173.5814056  0.143920138 
CRCAM Touraine et Poitou FRA  1  705.949  0.007534365  206.5726166  0.335144967  108.1418686  0.081288323 
CRCAM Morbihan FRA  3  572.215  0.007838781  81.29877472  0.378207535  124.3241272  0.143890679 
CRCAM Nord De France FRA  1  1689.307  0.008329921  92.31556702  0.397599339  375.8135376  0.138689458 
CRCAM Atlantique Vendee FRA  2  1231.210  0.009426761  199.941803  0.428981066  153.2693481  0.061744865 
CRCAM Brie Picardie FRA  2  1461.694  0.012603469  249.2119751  0.489549041  438.3301392  0.128955618 
Credit Agricole FRA  3  122368.195  0.015177063  41.97698975  1.394251585  38105.37109  0.793215394 
Natixis FRA  3  28825.768  0.011248422  25.00579453  1.142300844  12074.8418  0.873718977 
Rothschild and Co FRA  1  -217.783  0.00741158  20.70699692  0.522792101  953.4487915  0.958823979 
Societe Generale Group FRA  3  70604.711  0.013450509  39.96392441  1.402905822  35636.78906  1.05896461 
Barclays GBR  3  102335.461  0.01305501  24.11451149  1.327796698  46929.80078  1.244517565 
HSBC Holdings GBR  3  26576.365  0.006455679  48.89240646  0.408925146  139454.2031  1.409381986 
Investec GBR  1  2758.923  0.015428014  83.57341766  1.178666949  3512.855957  0.910325408 
Lloyds Banking Group GBR  3  40050.313  0.012243764  21.34240913  1.176640749  47021.04297  1.810645223 
Nationwide Building Society GBR  3  22941.590  0.005071634  127.6891632  0.284092665  1265.695068  0.080044627 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group GBR  3  98711.773  0.012929882  12.72560787  1.262645245  42726.91797  0.993457973 
Secure Trust Bank GBR  1  -298.515  0.00416484  34.68941498  0.395602733  526.3799438  3.918032885 
Standard Chartered GBR  3  11112.492  0.01176663  34.05759811  1.195171356  31590.29688  1.664121032 
Alpha Bank GRC  3  1820.731  0.007607359  7.694550514  1.134265423  6049.511719  1.613457441 
Attica Bank GRC  1  135.648  0.005034237  6.440349102  1.036868095  382.8707886  1.549787998 
Eurobank Ergasias GRC  3  2517.655  0.006865981  7.082958698  1.203996778  6124.986328  1.553241134 
National Bank of Greece GRC  3  2632.854  0.007906822  4.167312622  1.149781227  9143.253906  1.667377949 
Piraeus Bank GRC  1  2514.644  0.007418145  4.406926155  1.29040122  4295.94873  1.600987196 
Depfa Bank IRL  1  16609.684  0.006191196  12.28033829  0.876071215  5258.584961  1.827822685 
Banca Carige ITA  1  827.011  0.009174598  19.00630188  0.851867914  3101.825195  0.885173678 
Banca Finnat Euramerica ITA  1  -82.687  0.006259681  4.078624249  0.670528829  204.2036591  1.30452168 
Banca Generali ITA  1  -459.398  0.01523415  24.39142036  1.109371424  1881.590576  4.023583889 
Banca Ifis ITA  1  -43.071  0.009486132  10.19067383  0.71671325  633.086731  2.440440655 
BIM ITA  1  -286.922  0.00436037  8.178188324  0.541989148  776.6318359  1.881037354 
Banca Mediolanum ITA  1  354.375  0.012913267  24.69230843  1.290639639  4900.019043  4.903009892 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena ITA  3  12934.268  0.009841322  8.61127758  1.225691438  8121.392578  0.79960829 
Banca Popolare Di Sondrio ITA  1  452.889  0.008347902  57.51979065  0.694822788  2562.26416  181.2174225 
Banca Profilo ITA  1  17.217  0.00750115  13.54557037  0.969615519  276.2577515  1.890980124 
Banco BPM ITA  3  7114.547  0.011691041  13.22085762  1.246133447  5936.673828  23.97793579 
Banco Di Desio E Della Brianza ITA  3  358.429  0.008979498  28.41855812  0.696234822  633.4046021  1.031785727 
Bper Banca ITA  3  2793.396  0.010112206  50.70727921  0.979093373  3356.854004  1.012470007 
Conafi ITA  1  -51.040  0.006688542  17.57960129  0.729406893  84.99110413  1.818447828 
Credito Emiliano ITA  3  1397.438  0.01182472  59.3552742  1.038125157  2410.925781  1.31563127 
Credito Valtellinese ITA  1  1276.292  0.008885185  21.13791275  0.875893176  1097.975098  0.711254954 
FinecoBank ITA  1  -401.490  0.008967301  58.2365036  1.105085611  4099.073242  5.667462826 
Intesa Sanpaolo ITA  3  25246.189  0.011229392  22.40800095  1.211993456  35685.78516  1.061222076 
Mediobanca ITA  1  -29.649  0.010730479  43.71440125  1.137183785  8707.0625  1.608720541 
Unicredit ITA  3  45303.094  0.01227919  12.98951149  1.304559827  39050.91797  1.039805412 
Unione Di Banche Italiane ITA  3  5923.993  0.01280013  25.64300919  1.208103418  7841.083496  0.809497237 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 8 (continued ) 
Company Name Country IRBA SRISK Delta CoVaR Z-score Beta MV MtB 
ABN Amro Holding NLD  1  31265.100  0.00908393  3.781084776  0.920505941  39869.73828  1.802146077 
Binckbank NLD  1  -125.707  0.006983061  49.9913826  1.020031452  627.2797852  2.352247 
ING Groep NLD  3  67360.836  0.014527705  33.31870651  1.39409709  45837.81641  1.188655019 
Kas-Bank NLD  2  416.199  0.007873039  31.88780594  0.585314691  283.2165527  1.144174218 
Van LanschotKempen NLD  1  918.070  0.009393796  42.12671661  0.510897398  1066.565186  0.70769906 
Banco Bpi SA PRT  1  1570.434  0.009141952  18.87298775  0.760675848  2389.163086  1.563182116 
Banco Comercial Portugues PRT  3  3813.367  0.009778232  21.27783012  0.976748407  6427.01709  1.528923869 
a This table reports the list of banks with internal models information. We report company name, headquarters country, the last available information on the IRBA used, 
average SRISK market Beta, Delta CoVaR, Market capitalization and BtM of each bank. 
Table 9 
Unconditional quantile regressions of SRISK: year effects.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 
L.SRISK 0.00544*** 0.0103*** 0.356*** 0.00509*** 0.00932*** 0.352***  
(0.000225) (0.000536) (0.00542) (0.000222) (0.000531) (0.00540) 
Beta 332.0*** 2213*** 9118*** 361.8*** 2278*** 9446***  
(12.43) (34.55) (204.7) (12.59) (35.38) (207.4) 
Z-score -1.877*** -3.590*** -60.69*** -1.922*** -3.900*** -61.21***  
(0.140) (0.247) (1.122) (0.139) (0.251) (1.142) 
LVG 16.21*** 33.09*** 86.19*** 16.78*** 34.58*** 92.48***  
(0.223) (0.393) (2.923) (0.223) (0.391) (2.984) 
G-SIB FE 694.1*** 2236*** 22,920*** 703.9*** 2281*** 23,031***  
(17.81) (36.88) (326.8) (17.62) (36.47) (325.3) 
G-SIB -583.6*** -966.3*** -1692*** -596.5*** -1011*** -1836***  
(20.58) (48.43) (485.6) (20.34) (47.60) (480.9) 
CISS -217.3*** 36.11 6329*** -85.56 391.2*** 7786***  
(67.53) (126.6) (918.5) (67.79) (127.2) (918.4) 
Market Return 716.6 2949* 14,829 610.6 2755* 13,668  
(874.8) (1662) (11,786) (871.5) (1660) (11,738) 
ST interest rates -90.84*** -79.00*** -368.7*** -91.30*** -78.19*** -373.4***  
(7.193) (12.49) (56.79) (7.189) (12.41) (56.77) 
ECB Mon. Policy Assets -0.000396*** -0.000544*** 0.00450*** -0.000350*** -0.000220*** 0.00504***  
(2.90e-05) (5.64e-05) (0.000346) (3.06e-05) (5.88e-05) (0.000363) 
Misvaluation -787.1*** -579.4*** 144.1 -783.9*** -564.2*** 180.6*  
(13.17) (18.83) (104.7) (13.25) (18.64) (104.4) 
MV (centered) -31.00*** 305.4*** 3134*** -128.3*** -109.8*** 2037***  
(7.347) (12.45) (84.76) (12.00) (20.02) (145.3) 
IRBA-S/F 108.2** -166.2* -908.1* 68.29 -693.7*** -1405**  
(55.15) (89.05) (547.2) (58.47) (93.96) (579.8) 
IRBA-A/M 793.9*** 1563*** 11,099*** 681.9*** 916.8*** 9815***  
(57.07) (94.87) (601.3) (60.34) (99.80) (636.4) 
IRBA-S/F # MV    54.15*** 525.9*** 648.9***     
(15.80) (26.59) (176.2) 
IRBA-A/M # MV    375.8*** 894.5*** 4141***     
(15.73) (32.90) (291.2) 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 664.6*** -1091*** -23,297*** 483.8*** -1789*** -25,325***  
(65.99) (144.3) (882.9) (67.95) (146.4) (904.1) 
Observations 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 98,211 
Number of id 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.359 0.474 0.595 0.362 0.478 0.597 
RMSE 1520 2853 21367 1516 2843 21331 
Norm.RMSE 74.94 2.68 2.37 74.75 2.67 2.37 
a This table reports the results from the.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of weekly SRISK (Firpo et al., 2009). We include the bank-level IRBA dummies 
(categories IRBA-S/F and IRBA-A/M) with (models 1–3) and without interaction (models 4–6) with demeaned market capitalization. Instead of the Basel time 
dummies, we include year effects. All other variables remain the same. We control for country effects and lagged explanatory variables, in order: lagged SRISK, proxies 
for systematic risk as market Beta, Z-score and leverage ratio, Global Systemically Important Banks dummies (a fixed effect dummy and an annual dummy), CISS 
measure of market stress, market investment opportunities proxied by MSCI equity index, short-term interest rates and assets held by ECB for monetary policy 
purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the demeaned market capitalization. RMSE is reported as normalized by the 
respective percentile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
T. Gehrig and M.C. Iannino                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of Financial Stability 55 (2021) 100904
22
Table 10 
Unconditional quantile regressions of SRISK: macro country variables.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 
L.SRISK -0.00178 -0.00574* 0.200 -0.00192 -0.00571* 0.197  
(0.00217) (0.00291) (0.124) (0.00213) (0.00292) (0.124) 
Beta 113.9 571.2*** 5599*** 106.8 552.0*** 5745***  
(98.20) (104.1) (1933) (101.9) (105.2) (1868) 
Z-score -8.545*** -3.903 -21.86 -8.848*** -4.103 -23.75  
(2.612) (2.741) (25.16) (2.586) (2.701) (24.63) 
LVG -2.732 5.287 38.39 -2.553 4.996 44.84  
(3.437) (4.406) (35.65) (3.472) (4.374) (36.12) 
G-SIB FE       
G-SIB -676.4*** -757.9*** -1136 -666.3*** -753.6*** -1043  
(170.2) (208.0) (5372) (172.8) (207.8) (5326) 
CISS 316.2 724.9*** 363.1 249.3 674.6** 29.35  
(231.1) (274.3) (2793) (229.5) (263.3) (2774) 
Market Return 435.7 -503.7 16,485** 358.7 -609.4 16,729**  
(566.9) (827.3) (6768) (570.1) (809.3) (6494) 
ST interest rates -123.4*** -72.34* 671.4* -116.2*** -65.17* 684.4**  
(27.72) (39.28) (362.2) (28.44) (39.19) (339.1) 
ECB Mon. Policy Assets 0.000135*** 0.000138*** 0.000709 0.000134*** 0.000143*** 0.000630  
(5.12e-05) (4.99e-05) (0.000812) (5.03e-05) (4.88e-05) (0.000780) 
Misvaluation -453.3*** -317.8*** -2143 -458.8*** -321.2*** -2180  
(117.4) (120.7) (1386) (120.6) (121.3) (1412) 
MV (centered) -327.4*** -30.78 1402* -210.3** 72.73 1783  
(73.63) (86.66) (823.9) (102.5) (106.8) (1227) 
IRBA-S/F 613.3*** 595.3*** -89.63 852.2*** 771.1*** 1151  
(131.3) (185.3) (1882) (194.6) (257.2) (2186) 
IRBA-A/M 825.8*** 796.9** 10,713** 1013*** 975.7** 11,147**  
(257.3) (347.3) (4496) (313.3) (388.7) (4519) 
IRBA-S/F # MV    -230.1* -161.8 -1293     
(126.6) (102.4) (1306) 
IRBA-A/M # MV    -24.17 -142.4 1506     
(138.3) (134.9) (2084) 
Jan 1996- Jun2006 -241.5 -161.9 28,480 -336.3 -245.7 28,172  
(260.0) (402.5) (21,313) (277.6) (406.3) (21,190) 
Jun2006- Sep2008 -103.1 -314.8 25,985 -305.6 -498.4 25,386  
(315.2) (428.5) (21,758) (332.9) (429.8) (21,678) 
Sep2008- Sep2010 -249.2 93.83 27,902 -552.2 -143.7 26,518  
(370.2) (536.2) (21,472) (401.0) (517.6) (21,465) 
Sep2010- Nov2014 -147.8 139.7 30,429 -449.4 -100.4 29,101  
(374.9) (544.5) (21,435) (403.5) (527.0) (21,411) 
Nov2014- Dec2018 -215.5 136.0 28,661 -514.0 -105.9 27,403  
(375.0) (544.3) (21,519) (405.2) (531.4) (21,559) 
L.HUR 59.32** 164.9*** 327.0 59.95** 165.0*** 334.4  
(23.77) (34.80) (495.1) (24.43) (35.03) (491.9) 
L.PPI 1.930 16.05* -67.35 -0.149 13.76 -68.25  
(6.283) (8.693) (90.64) (6.197) (8.512) (91.92) 
L.QGDP -64.74** -61.12 -207.2 -66.18** -59.74 -246.8  
(27.37) (45.19) (451.2) (28.25) (45.32) (457.0) 
Constant -207.6 -1304** -32,964 -104.6 -1199** -32,805  
(410.2) (548.1) (21,932) (426.1) (538.4) (21,880) 
Firm Effects yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** 
Observations 78,239 78,239 78,239 78,239 78,239 78,239 
Number of id 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.302 0.318 0.166 0.307 0.319 0.169 
RMSE 1137 1441 18175 1134 1440 18150 
Norm.RMSE 56.06 1.35 2.02 55.91 1.35 2.02 
a This table reports the results from the.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of weekly SRISK (Firpo et al., 2009). Instead of country effects, we include 
firm fixed effects and country macro variables, such as harmonized unemployment rate, PPI, and GDP. All other variables remain the same. We include the bank-level 
IRBA dummies (categories IRBA-S/F and IRBA-A/M) with (models 1–3) and without interaction (models 4–6) with demeaned market capitalization. We include the 
time dummies identifying the Basel process: “Market Risk Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), “Basel II" (1: between June 2006 and September 2008), 
“Basel III" (1: between September 2008 and September 2010), “European Crisis" (1: between September 2010 to November 2014), and “Banking Union" (1: after 
November 2014). We then control for country effects, and lagged explanatory variables, in order: lagged SRISK, market Beta, Z-score and leverage ratio, Global 
Systemically Important Banks dummies (a fixed effect dummy and an annual dummy), CISS measure of market stress, MSCI equity index, short-term interest rates, 
assets held by ECB for monetary policy purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the demeaned market capitalization. RMSE is 
reported as normalized by the respective percentile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 11 
Unconditional quantile regressions of SRISK: number of annual M&A.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 Q.25 Q.5 Q.75 
L.SRISK 0.00527*** 0.0100*** 0.373*** 0.00488*** 0.00921*** 0.370***  
(0.000222) (0.000519) (0.00566) (0.000219) (0.000516) (0.00565) 
Beta 309.4*** 2093*** 9073*** 355.8*** 2190*** 9511***  
(12.22) (32.68) (208.6) (12.47) (33.94) (212.4) 
Z-score -2.116*** -3.963*** -62.25*** -2.138*** -4.083*** -62.41***  
(0.139) (0.239) (1.152) (0.139) (0.241) (1.162) 
LVG 15.95*** 32.17*** 90.02*** 16.77*** 34.01*** 97.59***  
(0.225) (0.380) (3.034) (0.225) (0.376) (3.102) 
G-SIB FE 740.3*** 2248*** 24,108*** 743.6*** 2259*** 24,136***  
(18.01) (36.17) (346.4) (17.82) (35.75) (344.9) 
G-SIB -598.4*** -989.2*** -1609*** -605.8*** -1017*** -1672***  
(20.28) (46.43) (503.9) (19.97) (45.73) (500.1) 
CISS -178.0*** -229.4** 2630*** -76.71 97.37 3506***  
(51.17) (90.14) (689.5) (52.09) (91.59) (698.0) 
Market Return 533.8 771.8 -335.6 687.0 1066 1123  
(874.1) (1620) (12,187) (870.5) (1617) (12,147) 
ST interest rates -67.21*** -39.55*** -783.8*** -75.33*** -61.70*** -856.7***  
(4.445) (7.692) (58.27) (4.666) (8.201) (60.43) 
ECB Mon. Policy Assets 1.91e-05* -0.000103*** 0.000111 1.26e-05 -0.000104*** 4.18e-05  
(1.08e-05) (2.20e-05) (0.000169) (1.07e-05) (2.20e-05) (0.000169) 
Misvaluation -792.7*** -614.6*** -23.43 -786.8*** -598.8*** 29.94  
(13.21) (18.09) (108.8) (13.23) (17.73) (108.0) 
Annual number of M&A -8.291*** -10.02*** -32.08*** -8.556*** -10.94*** -34.33***  
(0.523) (0.909) (7.106) (0.519) (0.901) (7.105) 
MV (centered) -66.82*** 278.2*** 3133*** -208.5*** -142.8*** 1883***  
(6.965) (11.52) (83.64) (10.55) (17.22) (128.6) 
IRBA1/2 274.6*** -218.6 -2156** 98.99 -898.4*** -3600***  
(102.3) (158.3) (999.6) (104.7) (159.8) (1016) 
IRBA3 967.3*** 1488*** 10,076*** 696.2*** 655.1*** 7701***  
(103.3) (161.5) (1031) (105.8) (163.5) (1051) 
IRBA1/2 # MV    139.4*** 590.8*** 1112***     
(14.45) (23.83) (162.5) 
IRBA3 # MV    463.4*** 961.2*** 4367***     
(14.32) (30.13) (288.2) 
Jan1996- Jun2006 -713.6*** -978.4*** 4472*** -625.8*** -709.5*** 5241***  
(30.39) (60.31) (539.3) (30.93) (61.74) (542.1) 
Jun2006- Sep2008 -1174*** -1420*** 1155 -933.6*** -709.1*** 3277***  
(105.1) (166.5) (1104) (106.9) (167.6) (1114) 
Sep2008- Sep2010 -1347*** -1445*** -2816** -1113*** -600.5*** -851.3  
(112.7) (180.8) (1236) (115.2) (183.9) (1252) 
Sep2010- Nov2014 -1377*** -1579*** -780.9 -1110*** -652.7*** 1490  
(111.5) (178.1) (1213) (114.4) (181.5) (1228) 
Nov2014- Dec2018 -1416*** -1359*** -426.3 -1156*** -456.1** 1777  
(113.2) (182.0) (1243) (116.1) (185.2) (1257) 
Constant 790.4*** -941.3*** -8857*** 648.0*** -1342*** -10,129***  
(43.49) (82.79) (643.1) (44.83) (85.65) (649.9) 
Country Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects no no no no no no 
Observations 97,408 97,408 97,408 97,408 97,408 97,408 
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.352 0.467 0.595 0.358 0.473 0.596 
RMSE 1532 2803 22239 1526 2788 22200 
Norm.RMSE 75.54 2.63 2.47 75.24 2.62 2.47 
a This table reports the results from the.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of weekly SRISK (Firpo et al., 2009). We include the annual number of 
mergers and acquisitions in the overall uncleaned sample as additional regressor. All other variables remain the same. We include the bank-level IRBA dummies 
(categories IRBA-S/F and IRBA-A/M) with (models 1–3) and without interaction (models 4–6) with demeaned market capitalization. We include the time dummies 
identifying the Basel process: “Market Risk Amendment" (1: between 1996 and June 2006), “Basel II" (1: between June 2006 and September 2008), “Basel III" (1: 
between September 2008 and September 2010), “European Crisis" (1: between September 2010 to November 2014), and “Banking Union" (1: after November 2014). 
We then control for country effects, and lagged explanatory variables, in order: lagged SRISK, market Beta, Z-score and leverage ratio, Global Systemically Important 
Banks dummies (a fixed effect dummy and an annual dummy), CISS measure of market stress, MSCI equity index, short-term interest rates, assets held by ECB for 
monetary policy purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the demeaned market capitalization. RMSE is reported as 
normalized by the respective percentile. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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a This table reports the results from the.25,.50 and.75 unconditional quantile regressions of weekly dollar Delta CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Delta CoVaR 
as Eq. (6) is multiplied by market capitalization to obtain a dollar version. We include the bank-level IRBA dummies (categories IRBA-S/F and IRBA-A/M) with (models 
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dummy), CISS measure of market stress, MSCI equity index, short-term interest rates, assets held by ECB for monetary policy purposes, the misvaluation in the bank’s 
equity as (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and the demeaned market capitalization. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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